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INTRODUCTION
Taxation is shadow life. As our culture monetizes more and more
life activities, the shadow grows. This Article looks at the potential tax
issues arising from a new life activity: online role-playing games in virtual
worlds. Currently, some thirty million people regularly play such games
and the number is growing.' Exploring the reach of the Tax Code into
virtual world transactions not only responds to the potentially practical
needs of millions of U.S. taxpayers, it also permits a reevaluation of core
principles of income tax as they interplay with life activities in the
context of twenty-first century American culture.
This Article's central thesis is that while player activity in virtual
worlds undoubtedly produces measurable economic value to the player,
player activity that occurs solely within the online virtual world is not
gross income under current doctrine, nor should current doctrine change.
The Article argues that a "cash out" rule for determining gross income is
the appropriate rule, both descriptively and normatively. Players whose
added wealth consists solely in what I shall define as "units of play"
should not be taxed unless and until they convert those units into cash or
property that is something other than a unit of play. Conversely, players
whose in-world wealth becomes less like units of play and more like a
medium of exchange can and should count virtual world transactions as
producing gross income. When the play ceases, taxation begins. The
i. Julian Dibbell, The Life of the Chinese Gold Farmer, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 17, 2007, at 36.
The best educated guess on the number of players comes from Bruce Woodcock, see An Analysis of
MMOG Subscription Growth, http://mmogchart.com/Analysis.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2oo7), who
put the number at 12.5 million in June 2006. Subscription information is closely guarded by game
developers. Id. While a breakdown of U.S. citizen players for all games is not available it seems
reasonable to suspect that they comprise a substantial fraction of the total since Woodcock estimates
that about 30% of the subscribers to the single largest online game, World of Warcraft, are Americans.
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resulting line-drawing difficulties have nothing to do with the intent of
the player and have nothing to do with "fun" and "games." Instead, the
issue presented is as old as the Tax Code itself: at what point does
economic gain become taxable gain? The new context of virtual worlds
allows for a renewed exploration of how and why the legal concept of
"income" differs, and indeed must differ, from the economic concept.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the relevant
facts of online role-playing games. It describes two popular virtual worlds
which sit at opposite ends of the spectrum of online gaming-World of
Warcraft and Second Life-and describes how two types of game-related
activity in each produce economic income to players. Part II reviews the
basic rules of income taxation in the United States federal system. It
explains the potential broadness of the term "gross income" in § 6i of
the Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") and introduces three concepts that
form important doctrinal limits to the term. Part II argues that these
doctrinal limits, whether imposed by Congress, the courts, or the IRS,
are best thought of as operational limits, arising not so much from
economic theory as from a practical need to promote voluntary
compliance and prevent government overreach. Part III applies the basic
tax rules described in Part II to virtual worlds and advances a theory
based on "units of play" to distinguish between virtual worlds used for
play and those that have become the equivalent of barter clubs. Part III
uses the concept of imputed income to discuss when in-world economic
activity-the trade of purely virtual goods or services for virtual money-
will cast a real world tax shadow.'
I. THE VIRTUAL WORLDS OF MASSIVELY MULTIPLAYER ONLINE ROLE-
PLAYING GAMES (MMORPGs)
Role-playing games have existed in some form online since the early
days of the Internet; but they have expanded enormously as game
developers have created extraordinarily rich graphical representations of
virtual worlds.3 In a role-playing game, a player uses an online persona,
called an avatar, to assume a role within the context of the game
environment and plays the game from within that role. This part first
offers a typology for role-playing games. It then describes two types of
activity that create economic value to the player and raise interesting tax
questions.
2. For a well-considered argument that one virtual world, Second Life, already casts such a real
world tax shadow, see Leandra Lederman, Stranger Than Fiction: Taxing Virtual Worlds, 92 N.Y.U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2007).
3. F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REV. I, 14-
29 (2004) (reviewing history of virtual worlds).
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A. STRUCTURED AND UNSTRUCTURED MMORPGs
Role-playing games fall along a continuum from highly structured
games to highly unstructured games. A structured game presents its
players with pre-set roles and pre-set challenges and objectives. It
generally sets complex rules for player interaction both with players and
with computer-generated non-player characters (NPCs). In deistic terms,
the game creators are like the Greek gods, constantly intervening in the
lives of the avatars, both to hinder and to help them achieve the
objectives of the game which, like Greek mythology, generally involves
fighting, quests, and conquests. In contrast, an unstructured game has
few rules, no objectives, and no pre-set roles. In deistic terms, the game
creators are like the Enlightenment's benign watchmaker God, who built
the world but otherwise pretty much leaves it alone. An example of an
online game located at each end of the spectrum will serve to illustrate
the subsequent discussion of tax issues.
i. Structured Games
World of Warcraft (WOW) is an example of a highly structured role-
playing game. Launched in 2004, it currently has some 8.5 million
subscribers worldwide, including between 1.5 and 2 million in North
America.4 A WoW subscriber can choose to play one of several character
roles, such as a druid, hunter, warrior, or mage. Players play these roles
through virtual representations of self, commonly called avatars. In
WoW, a player's avatar may take one of many life forms, such as human,
dwarf, orc, troll, etc. Players in WoW can also give their avatars up to
two primary professions, such as herbalism, alchemy, mining,
blacksmithing, etc. Thus, one might choose to be a human warrior whose
two primary professions are mining and blacksmithing. When one is not
off fighting beasts one might be finding ore, acquiring other ingredients,
and then using the pre-defined "recipes" at a village forge to "make" a
virtual sword.
Several aspects of WoW put it at the structured end of the
structured/unstructured curve. First, characters are highly structured.
WoW puts players into strongly pre-defined roles within the context of
an overall storyline. Warriors have certain traits. Paladins have others.
You cannot mix and match. Each role brings with it pre-programmed
strengths and weaknesses. Players engage in quests-to find treasure,
slay monsters and dragons, rescue NPCs, fight for their Guild, faction, or
4. See Press Release, Blizzard Entertainment, World of Warcraft: The Burning Crusade
Continues Record-Breaking Sales Pace (Mar. 7, 207) (available at http://www.blizzard.com/press/
070307.shtml). My description of Wow comes from my own tours of the game, discussions with
gainers, the official game guide, see World of Warcraft Game Guide,
http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/info/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2007), and from World of Warcraft-
Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikifWorldof__Warcraft (last visited Oct.
31, 2007) [hereinafter Wikipedia, World of Warcraft].
[Vol. 59: 1
November 2007] A THEORY OF TAXING VIRTUAL WORLDS
whatever. For each mission accomplished the game developers reward
players with greater skills, weapons, talents, game treasure, or other
goodies. For example if you approach an NPC for a quest, you might be
asked to kill an NPC monster who, once dead, yields up the rare and very
useful Potion of Invisibility.' In a structured game, NPCs play a
significant role in guiding game play.6
Second, the range of virtual items that can be acquired is heavily
controlled by the game developers who create the items and their
characteristics. In WoW, as in most other structured games, one acquires
virtual items in one of two ways. First, one picks them up either by
finding them in a sort of treasure hunt, or by earning them after
completing a quest. Second, one "makes" them by simply clicking the
mouse button a few times in a pre-set order. Making an item involves a
"recipe" where one's character must gather the ingredients (or buy them
from another player or NPC) and then assemble them. Thus, in WoW,
once one finds all the necessary ingredients and clicks on all of them in
the proper order, the virtual item-a sword, cloth, shield, magic potion,
or other item-is made. Unlike real life, the process is always successful
and produces the same result each time: a new virtual item. This is
commonly called "crafting."7 But the crafting does not create anything
that has not been thought of and incorporated into the game by the
designers. Crafted objects are first created by the game developers.
While players may discover (and exploit) unintended interactions
between various virtual objects, those interactions arise from the
programming by the game developer and not from player programming.
Third, structured games typically involve "leveling." The game
developers assign skill points to characters based on the characters'
activities. The more you kill, the better you get at it in that the computer
assigns you better odds of success in battle. Acquiring various items
increases your chances of success at different tasks. A special sword
might give you a I % edge in battle; an even better sword with a spell on
it might give you a 2% edge. Players also develop their professional
skills-such as mining or smithing-by performing repetitive crafting
tasks. Miners click and mine ore. Blacksmiths click and craft swords,
5. See Allakhazam.com: Invisibility Potion, http://wow.allakhazam.com/db/item.html?witem=
9172&locale=enUS;source=live (last visited Oct. 31, 2007). 1 have tried to use examples of actual items
used in Wow, although readers must understand that items present today may not, by the whim of
game developers, be present tomorrow.
6. Examples of other well-known structured games are Everquest, Dark Age of Camelot, City of
Heroes, Lineage, and Ultima Online.
7. Cory Ondrejka, Escaping the Gilded Cage: User-Created Content and Building the Metaverse.
in THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW, GAMES, AND VIRTUAL WORLDS 158, (Jack Balkin & Beth Noveck eds.,
20o6). There are different levels of crafting as well. Some games may not allow a perfect result every
time; other games may randomly assign special characteristics to your virtual item, over which you
have no control.
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once they have all the necessary ingredients. The more the miner mines,
the greater the skill level the computer assigns to the character and the
better quality product the character can produce. Likewise with
blacksmiths. Crafting a set number of swords or armor increases the
blacksmith's skill by a structured, pre-set, increment. Highly skilled
blacksmiths craft really great swords that highly skilled warriors can use
to increase their chances of success in quests and thereby increase their
own skill levels.
As players gain skills their characters "level up" to more intricate
and harder game play. In WoW, all players start out at Level i and can
advance until their character achieves Level 70. They can then start
another character or else play at that level with the friends they have
made along the way. As players achieve higher levels of skill, the game
developers make the quests more difficult and also give more powerful
weapons, armor, spells, clothing, mounts, and other items to the
characters. Game developers are constantly trying to create more game
content-items, loot, quests, storylines-to keep the game interesting for
both newcomers and hard-core gamers.
An important part of game play is the interaction between players,
both cooperative and competitive. Quests embody the cooperative side.
In WoW, players perform higher level quests in groups of up to twenty
five characters. To facilitate questing, players generally band together in
guilds. One or more players will "found" a guild and then recruit others
to join. The others might be friends in real life or might be friends made
in-world. Guilds often have up to thirty-five or forty members and larger
guilds number in the hundreds. Players also "cooperate" in that the
various supporting professions sell or trade items to enhance the powers
and abilities of other characters. A priest might create excellent
defensive spells which a warrior might find very useful to strengthen a
weakness in defensive skills. It is this latter form of cooperative exchange
that gives rise to the economics of gaming and potential tax issues.
On the competitive side, structured games build competition into
their game play. Not only is there the indirect competition between
players to go higher, faster, and further, but many structured games allow
direct competition between players, generally in the form of player-to-
player combat. In addition to those forms of competition, WoW is
structured into two opposing factions, the Alliance and the Horde, who
compete with each other for treasure, quests, all while being at constant
war. Different NPCs in different parts of the virtual world are friendly to
one side or the other. And players and guilds can do more than fight the
NPCs; they can fight other players and other groups either singly (think
duels) or in groups (think rumbles).
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2. Unstructured Games
Second Life (SL) is an example of an unstructured role-playing
game. Launched in 2003, it had approximately eight million "residents"
as of July 17, 2007.8 Like WoW, players participate in SL through an
online character, or avatar. While avatars are limited in their basic form
(players can choose human or a variety of non-human forms), players
have enormous ability to modify their avatar's appearance.9 More
importantly, SL avatars have few pre-set characteristics or skills and the
skills they do have (such as flying) do not improve automatically with
repetition. Nor do they have structured roles. There are no quests, no
missions. There are few NPCs. The game developers do not attempt to
define the game environment except by providing virtual landscapes and
the means by which to create almost any virtual item imaginable through
a basic computer script available to every player.'" It is like playing with
LEGOs online.
The basic building blocks in SL are called "primitives" or "prims"
and one can fashion almost any item imaginable from them. Players can
and do build anything from real estate (homes, shops, discos, movie
theaters, gardens, arenas), to personal items (clothing, body parts,
furniture, pictures, vehicles, airplanes, fireworks, art), to recreation items
(thunderstorms, pets, magic fountains, toys), to animation routines that
make avatars do things like dance, skip, make faces, or simulate sex.
Players who also want to fight can do that and can build weapons and
shields from the prims. Players can use prims to make more overt or
traditional expressive products, like movies, sculptures, magazines, or
dance.
Player interaction is more crucial for SL gameplay than for WoW.
While social interaction is important to structured games, it is vital to
non-structured games. The whole point of the game is interaction:
players spend their time interacting with other players. The interaction
8. See Second Life: Economic Statistics, http://www.secondlife.com/whatis/economy-stats.php
(last visited Oct. 31, 2007) (providing updated information on in-world activity); see also Robert K.
Elder, 1.4 Million Get a Virtual Life, CHI. TRIB. WEB EDITION, Nov. 13, 2006,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/technology/chi-o6i 15302 ionovI3,t,2778726.story?track=rss; Reena
Jana & Aili McConnon, Second Life Lessons, Bus. WK., Nov. 27, 2006, at 17. My description of SL
comes from my own tours of the game world, the SL website description, Second Life: What is Second
Life?, http://secondlife.com/whatis/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2007); the Wikipedia article at Second Life-
Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second-Life (last visited Oct. 31,
2oo7); Roger Parloff's description in Anshe Chung: First Virtual Millionaire, CNNMoNEY.COM, Nov. 27,
2006, http:/legalpad.blogs.fortune.cOm/2o6/il/27/anshe-chung-first-virtual-millionaire/ [hereinafter
Parloff, Anshe Chung]; and Robert D. Hof, My Virtual Life, Bus. WK., May t, 2006, at 72.
9. For one amusing rant, see Posting of Lisa Galarneau to Terra Nova,
http://terranova.blogs.com/terra-nova/2oo6/o8/my-other- self i.html (Aug. 23, 2006) (observing
limited clothing options in World of Warcraft for female avatars in contrast to Second Life).
to. Other well-known non-structured games are Sims Online and There. Doubtless others will
have sprung into existence by the time this Article is printed and published in hardcopy.
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can be social or economic, cooperative or competitive. Precisely because
an estimated 99% of SL content is user-generated, the main activity for
many players-or "residents" as they are often called-is to visit
different parts of the SL world and play or trade in them." Players
engage each other cooperatively by, for example, going to a virtual
school to learn how to script virtual objects, or building communities of
shared values, or dancing or having virtual sex (commonly called
tinysex). Players also engage competitively by, for example, trying to sell
items in market competition, or trying to outdo others in social status
competition, or by playing games or by fighting in player-versus-player
combat in the areas so designated. In sum, players have fun trying on
various personas, body parts, or clothes, seeing different sights, and
meeting other people for chat, games, sex, fighting, or trade. As with
structured games, it is this latter activity which creates the engine of the
in-world economy and raises the taxation issues addressed by this
Article.
B. INCOME-GENERATING ACTIVITIES
Unlike online poker or casino games, role-playing games initially
seemed to have little connection with money. They were first conceived
and played as escapist fantasy, online versions of Dungeons and
Dragons. 2 But as the economist Edward Castronova discovered in his
influential 2001 study of a single mid-sized online role-playing game
called Everquest, virtual economies are an integral part of game play as
game developers create conditions of scarcity. 3 Further, in-game
economies have readily ascertainable real world value to players.
Castronova estimated that the gross national product of Everquest was
$135 million, or $2,226 per capita. He further estimated that "an hour in
[Everquest] produces utility worth $14.15" to the average player, and
that the average avatar "wage" (as measured by "regressing the total
value of an avatar's equipment and cash by the number of hours that
avatar had been active") was $3.42 per hour.' 4 Since then, stories abound
of players turning their game play into real income, and of players who
have amassed virtual assets worth over a million U.S. dollars. 5 In 2oo6,
I I. Ondrejka, supra note 7, at 163 (stating that "well over 99 percent of the objects in Second Life
are user created").
12. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 3, at 14-29.
13. Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Society on the
Cyberian Frontier 16-17 (Ctr. for Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
618, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=294828 ("And, somewhat shockingly, scarcity is what
makes the [Virtual World] so fun .... In a post-industrial society, it is social status, more than anything
else, that drives people to work so diligently all their lives. In this respect, [Virtual Worlds] are truly a
simulacrum of Earth society."). At that time Everquest had a medium-sized base of 240,000 players.
14. Id. at 35.
15. See, e.g., Julian Dibbell, The 79th Richest Nation on Earth Doesn't Exist, WIRED, Jan. 2003, at
io6; Hof, supra note 8, at 72; Laurence H. M. Holland & David M. Ewalt, Making Real Money in
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writer Julian Dibbell recounted his experiences in buying and selling
"virtual loot" for real U.S. dollars, including his humorous attempt to
seek tax advice from the IRS. 6
The heart of economic activity in both structured and non-structured
games is trade. Both structured and unstructured MMORPGs facilitate
game play through the use of on-line mediums of exchange. In WoW, the
top unit of in-world currency is called Gold and is broken down into
subunits called Silver and Copper. One Gold piece is equal to one
hundred Silver pieces or ten thousand Copper pieces. In SL, the sole unit
of currency is called the Linden Dollar (reflecting the name of the
company that owns SL, Linden Lab). I will use the symbol G$ to
represent WoW currency and the symbol L$ to represent SL currency
and the symbol US$ to represent U.S. dollars. Players with a paid
subscription to SL receive periodic "allowances" of virtual currency. 7
Players create wealth through two types of activity: in-world and
real-world. First, players create wealth by trades conducted wholly within
the game environment. In-world transactions (IWT) might take the form
of swapping virtual items for other virtual items, or swapping virtual
items for in-world currency, or swapping in-world services for in-world
currency. Second, players engage in what is typically called real money
trading (RMT) whereby they sell either individual virtual items or entire
player accounts for real-world currency on sites like eBay or other third
party vending sites. I shall discuss each type of activity in turn.
i. In-World Transactions (JWT)
In-world transactions (IWT) are an important part of both
structured and unstructured games. In structured games such as WoW,
all characters need virtual items such as swords, potions, guns, and spells
in order to play and advance levels. These virtual items are crafted by
those characters in the production professions such as blacksmiths,
alchemists, engineers, and mages. To make these items requires a recipe
and ingredients. NPCs provide recipes (more complex ones to higher
level professionals) and the gathering professions provide the
ingredients. The game environment thus creates a market between those
Virtual Worlds, FORBES.COM, Aug. 7, 2006, http:lwww.forbes.conm/careersl2oo6/o8/o7/virtual-world-
jobscxdeo87virtualjobs.html; Parloff, Anshe Chung, supra note 8; Roger Parloff, From Megs to
Riches, FORTUNE, Nov. 28, 2005, at 184; Mark Wallace, The Game is Virtual, The Profit is Real, N.Y.
TIMES, May 29, 2005, § 3, at 7.
16. JULIAN DIBBELL, PLAY MONEY: OR How I QUrr MY DAY JOB AND MADE MILLIONS TRADING
VIRTUAL LOOT 302-13 (2006).
17. How game developers control (or don't control) the volume of in-world currency is beyond
the scope of this Article, but developers have an array of mechanisms to prevent either intolerable
inflation or deflation. For one readable discussion, see Grace Wong, How Real Money Works in
Second Life, CNNMONEY.coM, Dec. 8, 2oo6, http://money.cnn.coMl2oo6/2/o8/technology/
sl_lindexlindex.htm.
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who gather and those who produce.
For example, if one is a blacksmith and needs a series of ingredients
to make a special sword, one might acquire some of the ingredients
oneself if one is also a gatherer, such as a miner. But the recipes are
structured to encourage trade between players. Further, "some players
choose to select only 'gathering' professions, opting to supply resources
to players with item creation skills. These players will typically offer
gathered items for sale in the game's auction houses.'.
Here is an example taken from the WoW website:
A Human Warrior seeking to quest in the more dangerous parts of
Azeroth has commissioned you to forge a powerful weapon for his use.
As one of the most celebrated Human weaponsmiths in Stormwind,
you are used to this sort of request. What is unusual, though, are the
four pieces of jade (a useful and rare material) the Warrior is willing to
trade for your work. And so you set yourself to the forge and begin the
process of creating a deadly frost tiger blade. Checking your recipe,
you find that the following ingredients are needed to forge the weapon:
8 Steel Bars
2 Strong Flux
i Frost Oil
2 Jade
2 Heavy Grinding Stones
4 Heavy Leather
As a weaponsmith, you maintain a stock of iron ore and grinding
stones (needed to polish and sharpen the weapon to a fine razor's
edge). You take a quick trip to the forge to smelt the iron ore and coal
into steel bars. A nearby merchant sells the strong flux that removes
impurities from the steel. To fill out the ingredients list, you make your
way to an alchemist, but unfortunately you learn that he requires the
herb wintersbite to make frost oil for you. So, to acquire the
wintersbite herb, you trade a stack of sharpening stones to your friend,
who happens to be an herbalist, and then you give the wintersbite to
the alchemist, who then concocts the arcane frost oil for you.
Now the ingredients are complete, and you forge the weapon,
confident that there will be no failure and that the frost tiger blade will
be born from the rare ingredients used to create it. Thrilled with your
work, the Human Warrior leaves the remaining jade with you in
payment.'9
Backing up the player-to-player trade regime are the WoW NPC
traders. While NPC traders buy low and sell high, they are programmed
to always buy and sell, and always for a preset price. This forms the outer
i8. Wikipedia, World of Warcraft, supra note 4.
19. See World of Warcraft, Introduction to Professions, http://www.worldofwarcraft.cominfol
professions/intro.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2007).
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bounds of the player-to-player trading and also forms opportunities for
arbitrage based on asymmetrical information flow.2" Thus, in the above
example, if you were not able to find an herbalist player who had
wintersbite, and if you could not find one to pay to gather it, you would
have to find an NPC who had it and pay gold or silver or copper for it.
Since wintersbite is a moderately rare herb, found only in one region, it
may only be available from a few NPC merchants-requiring travel and
adventure to find it-or indeed it may not be available from any NPC
and, if so, finding it or buying it from another player would be the only
way to acquire it. In this way, IWT is essential to game play. It is the
scarcity of items required to advance in the game that keeps the game
interesting and enjoyable. And it is the scarcity that creates a market.
IWT plays an even more important role in unstructured games. It is
not going too far to describe Second Life as one article did: an online
capitalist fantasy game.2' For games like SL to attract and retain players,
player-to-player transactions are essential. The open-ended scripting
language made available to all players by the game creators allows any
player to create any object imaginable. Those players who have the time,
talent, and inclination can use SL's powerful scripting language to create
virtual objects that are fun to see or use. Since production costs are
negligible, players can sell copies of their work to other gamers who are
willing to substitute L$ for time and talent. Other gainers sell services. It
is not surprising to find the world's oldest profession flourishing in SL.22
In SL, virtual land can be "owned" within the game context by
players. SL sells land in blocks starting at 512 virtual square meters. As
implied by the designated size, the creation of each increment of virtual
land-and representation of what can now occur "on" that virtual land-
requires some corresponding increment of processing power and so
landowners not only pay a subscriber fee, they also pay a "property tax"
(called a "land use fee"). Some players act as virtual real estate
developers, buying land and then, after making landscaping or other
improvements, subdividing it, and re-selling or renting it out. 3 Although
20. See Bryn Davies, Sustainable Economics, Price Arbitrage, Information Assymetry and Elastic
& Inelastic Markets in a World of Warcraft Economy, http://www.progsoc.org/-curious/economics.html
(last visited Oct. 31, 2007).
21. Rachel Konrad, IBM to Open Islands in Virtual World, USAToDAY.COM, Dec. 13, 2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2oo6-12-13-ibm-second-life-x.html ("Second Life is a
subscription-based 3-D fantasy world devoted to capitalism-a 21St century version of Monopoly that
generates real money for successful players.").
22. See, e.g., Shawn Elliot, Escort Mission: Massively Multiplayer Online Games Get a New
Character Class: Call Girls, PCMAG.COM, May 16 2oo6, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/
o,2704,x964618,oo.asp.
23. That is how the wealthiest avatar in SL, Anshe Chung, makes her virtual money. See Robert
D. Hof, Second Life's First Millionaire, BUSINESSWEEK.COM, Nov. 26, 2006,
http://www.businessweek.conthethread/techbeat/archives/2oo6/i I/secondjlifes fi.html ("[Anshe
Chung] achieved her fortune by beginning with small scale purchases of virtual real estate which she
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"owned" within the game context, it is not clear whether real world
property rights attach to virtual land. It is also not clear what real world
property rights, if any, attach to virtual items in SL. That is the subject
both of a lawsuit in Pennsylvania and Part III of this Article.'
2. Real Money Trades (RMT)
Virtual transactions have real economic value because of RMT.
Although SL game developers give periodic "allowances" of in-world
currency to paid subscribers, it is not nearly enough if one wants to play
much. And if your WoW avatar does not complete quests or trade, it will
never acquire the gold necessary to level up. Thus, if one's friends are
playing WoW with Level 41 characters (who are entitled to upgraded
modes of transportation), one cannot keep up very well with a Level I
character. So one might want to buy a ready-made Level 41 character
rather than take the considerable game-time to level up a new character
to match the others. Or one might purchase a program that will make
your character perform the basic repetitive tasks that increase skill
points. 5 Similarly, if one needs a particular virtual item, such as a special
herb or sword, one might find it cheaper to buy it with real U.S. dollars
on an RMT exchange site than to find the time to harvest the necessary
gold.
The RMT market for virtual items is robust. The president of one
third-party auction site estimated that over $88o million dollars had
passed through that site during its 2004 operating year. 6 The purchase of
then subdivided and developed with landscaping and themed architectural builds for rental and resale.
Her operations have since grown to include the development and sale of properties for large scale real
world corporations, and have led to a real life "spin off" corporation called Anshe Chung Studios,
which develops immersive 3D environments for applications ranging from education to business
conferencing and product prototyping." (quoting Press Release, Anshe Chung Studios, Anshe Chung
Becomes First Virtual World Millionaire (Nov. 26, 2oo6), http://www.anshechung.com/include/press
press release251 io6.html)).
24- Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 595 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (denying motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and motion to compel arbitration); see also Kathleen Craig, Second Life
Land Deal Goes Sour, WIRED NEWS, May 18, 2oo6, http://www.wired.com/gaming/virtualworlds/
news/2oo6/o5/7o909. The suit is blogged regularly at the Terra Nova blog. See Posting of Dan Hunter
to Terra Nova, http:l/terranova.blogs.com/terra-nova2007/051bragg-andige_c.html (Oct. 30, 2oo6).
The Bragg case settled outside of court and so has passed this first opportunity for a judicial opinion
on the legal status of virtual property. See Posting of Greg L to Terra Nova, http://terranova.blogs.com
/terranova2007/lo/virtual-law-upd.html#more (Oct. 16, 2007).
25. For example, one program available for sale on eBay, called Airbot, is a robot program
described as "a tool that plays your World of Warcraft character for you. It allows you to be away
from the keyboard, while your character hunts the monsters you want, gathers gold, items, and high
amounts of experience." See WorldofBot.com, http://www.worldofbot.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2007).
26. This estimate was made by the President of IGE at the second State of Play conference
sponsored by New York Law School in December 2004. See Posting of Edward Castranova to Terra
Nova, http://terranova.blogs.comlterra nova/20041io/secondary-marke.html (Oct. 30, 2004). The
statement was quickly picked up by mainstream media. See Amy Kolz, Real Virtuality- The Worlds in
Online Games Are Imaginary-But the Property Isn't, THE AM. LAW., Dec. 6, 2oo4, at 38; Wallace,
supra note 15. One of the larger third party auction sites, covering most structured MMORGS, is
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virtual items through a third-party auction site is almost always a two-
step process because the deal almost always has to be closed within the
game environment. That is, the buyer essentially buys the seller's
agreement to meet the buyer's character in-world and give the purchased
item. From the perspective of the game, the item is transferred for no
charge.
Perhaps the most common virtual item to purchase is in-world
currency. Both the G$ and the L$ are highly liquid; players can easily
purchase, or sell, in-game currency for US$. The SL site has opened up
its own exchange, and earns about io% of its total revenue from
brokering trades." Over the past year the exchange rate has fluctuated
between L$250-29o per US$. 8 The price of WoW Gold depends in part
on what server one wishes to play on and, at the time this Article was
written, sold for a surprisingly disparate range of G$4-IO per US$.29
The high demand for G$ and L$ has spawned an entire third-world
industry-mostly in China-where labor is cheap. There, people are paid
to "farm" gold by playing the game and selling the virtual items thus
acquired to the NPC vendors who, while always paying the lowest price,
always pay. The G$ thus harvested is then resold on auction sites to
players who value their time at the price asked." The prices of virtual
items range from a few dollars to a few hundred dollars. One exuberant
player spent $ioo,ooo buying a virtual space station in an online game
called Entropia.3'
In addition to virtual item and currency sales, players of structured
games regularly sell their player accounts. A player's game account
might contain multiple characters.32 In a structured game like WoW, the
Allakhazam's Magical Realm. See Allakhazam.com, http://allakhazam.com (last visited Oct. 3 1, 2007).
27. Wong, supra note 17.
28. For current rates, see SL Exchange Market Summary, http://www.slexchange.com/
modules.php?name=Currency (last visited Oct. 31, 2007).
29. The price disparities can be huge. See, e.g., ThSale.com, Buy WoW Gold,
http://www.thsale.com/Cheap.o13.OI3,oo2,oo8.World of-warcraft_-_US.ArgentDawnUS-
Horde.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2007) (selling G$Ioo for use by Horde characters on Argent Dawn
server for US$23.8 5); WoWMine.com, Buy WoW Gold, https://www.wowmine.com/buy-cheap-
wholesale-wow-gold.php?serverarea=5 (last visited Oct. 31, 2007) (selling same for US$9.75);
IGE.com, Buy WoW Gold, http://www.ige.com/wowus/goldlargentdawnus/horde/worldofwarcraftus
_en.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2007) (selling same for US$26.35). Average prices at some third-party
sites are tracked at GameUSD.com. See Wow Gold Prices, http://www.gameusd.com/wow-gold.htm
(last visited Oct. 3 1, 2007). Price disparities may be partly due to the age and popularity of the server.
30. For a description of the gold farming operations, see Dibbell, supra note i, and Tim Johnson,
'Gold Farming' in Games Means Real Income in China, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 18, 2006,
available at LEXIS. The phenomenon has formed the theme of at least one work of short fiction. See
Cory Doctorow, Anda's Game, SALON.COM, Nov. 15, 2004, http://dir.salon.comlstoryltech/feature/
2004/1 /15/andas-game/index.html.
31. Peter Svensson, Man Pays $iooooo for Virtual Space Station, SPACE.COM, Nov. tO, 2005,
http://www.space.com/entertainment/ap0511i io-virtual-spacestationent.html.
32. See Castronova, supra note 13 (noting that in his study of the MMORPG "Everquest,"
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accounts are readily valued by the level of the characters being sold and
the nature of items owned by the characters within the game context. In
contrast, sales of player accounts for unstructured games are quite rare,
even though they can also be well valued. The most prominent example
was the valuation of Anshe Chung's account in SL.33
II. BASIC TAX PRINCIPLES'
Taxation shadows economic activity. To harvest the fiscal resources
necessary to nurture the best of all possible worlds, the tendrils of
taxation must take nourishment from those whose economic gardens
prosper.35 Historically, successful governments have based taxation on
three indicia of economic success: wealth, consumption, and income.6
For reasons beyond this Article's scope, the United States government
uses income as the tax base of choice.37 Taxes on income currently
players used an average of 2.72 avatars).
33. Daniel Terdiman, Virtual Magnate Shares Secrets of Success, CNET NEws.CoM, Dec. 20, 20o6,
http://news.com/2oo8-1O43-3-6i44967.html (reporting owner's claim that the value of Anshe Chung
Studios was "independently assessed ... by... investment firms" at over $I million).
34. I limit this Article's doctrinal analysis to individual taxpayers. Further, because this is an
article and not a book, I limit discussion to the issue of whether IWT gives rise to gross income within
the meaning of I.R.C. § 61 (2ooo). Thus I will not consider what exclusions or deductions might be
available to taxpayers, either those acting with the requisite continuity and regularity to constitute a
trade or business under Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987), or those engaging in the
activity as a hobby and thus subject to the rules in I.R.C. § 183. Although those are interesting issues,
they do not come into play unless and until the activity in question produces gross income within the
meaning of I.R.C. § 61. Nor will I consider issues of timing or characterization. Finally, please note
that this discussion applies only to those subject to U.S. income tax laws and so the primary taxpayer
population I discuss are U.S. citizens, who are taxed on worldwide income. To the extent that game
servers are physically located in the United States (for example, SL servers are all in California), then
the extent to which international taxation rules might subject all players to the U.S. income tax laws is
beyond the scope of this Article. For a good discussion of problems created by applying sourcing rules
to server transactions, see Arthur J. Cockfield, Transforming the Internet into a Taxable Forum: A
Case Study in E-Commerce Transactions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1171 (2OOI).
35. Although not without critics, this view is a longstanding one among those interested in the
subject of taxation. See EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACnCE OF
INCOME TAXATION 4 (2d ed. 1914) ("This history of finance, in other words, shows the evolution of the
principle of faculty or ability to pay-the principle that each individual should be held to help the state
in proportion to his ability to help himself."). One recent, attention-worthy article critiques
academicians for having abandoned this principle in tax theory scholarship and points out the resulting
gap between the academic and political justifications for an income tax. Theodore P. Seto & Sande L.
Buhai, Tax and Disability: Ability to Pay and the Taxation of Difference, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1053,
1083-86 (2oo6) (noting the vitality of the "ability to pay" principle in political discourse but not in
academic discourse).
36. See generally Noel Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income and the Choice of Tax Base,
52 TAX L. REv. 17 (i996) (discussing choice of base). State and local governments have traditionally
relied on consumption and wealth as tax bases, the usual examples being state sales taxes
(consumption) and local property taxes (wealth).
37. For a description of the early ascendancy of the income tax, see SELIGMAN, supra note 35, at
367-87. For a classic defense of using income as the tax base, see Richard Musgrave, In Defense of an
Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 44,45-46 (1967).
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account for almost 8o% of federal revenues."
The foundational legal concept of the Internal Revenue Code is
"gross income" as defined in § 61." Section i imposes tax on "taxable
income." Section 63 defines that term as "gross income minus the
deductions allowed by this chapter." And § 6i defines "gross income" as
"all income from whatever source derived." The regulations emphasize
that taxpayers have gross income when they receive anything of
economic value, whether in the form of cash, property, or services.4" The
Supreme Court has long interpreted the language in § 6i to extend as far
as constitutionally possible.4' In its talismanic phrase, "income" means
any "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which
the taxpayer[ has] complete dominion."' The form of the wealth does
not matter. The source of the wealth does not matter. The accession to it
does.
When taxpayers sell property, not all of the income received is gross
income within the meaning of § 6i. That is, the taxpayer's wealth is not
increased by all of what is received for the property because the property
generally has cost the taxpayer something in the first place. Section iooi
provides a formula: taxpayers subtract their "basis" in the property from
the "amount realized" from the disposition. Section Iooi(b) defines
"amount realized" as the sum of (a) all cash received plus (b) the fair
market value of any property received. The term "basis" is not defined
so much by statute as by case law.43 Basis is a complex topic but at its
38. In FY2005, the tax paid on the incomes of both individual and corporate taxpayers accounted
for 79.3% of all gross collections. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 2005, at I tbl.t (2005). 13.5% of gross collections came from corporate
income taxes, 48.8% came from individual income taxes, and 34.0% came from employment taxes. Id.
Since half of the employment tax is borne by workers and is a function of their wage income, I count
that 17.0% as an income tax. See id. In contrast, the employer portion of the tax is a tax on
consumption of labor, as measured by dollars spent. So viewed, consumption taxes-on the use of
labor as well as such diverse items as alcohol, fuel, and telephone calls-accounted for about 19.5 % of
gross collections in FY2oo5. Id. Even smaller is the federal tax on wealth-the estate and gift tax
regime-which made up only i.i% of the gross collections in FY2oo 5. Id. For those who notice, given
that FY200 5 gross collections amounted to over $2 billion, the missing o.i% is a heck of a rounding
error. See Bryan T. Camp, The Mysteries of Erroneous Refunds, 114 TAX NOTES 231 (2007). Even
taking the 79.3% figure as accurate does not show that income is truly the base. As others have noted,
the federal tax system has some features of a consumption tax when one considers the increasing
number of provisions, such as the Roth IRA, see I.R.C. § 4o8A (2ooo), or education savings accounts,
see I.R.C. § 529, that either defer tax on earnings in certain savings accounts until they are spent, or
else outright exclude such earnings from tax.
39. Unless otherwise noted, all references in text or notes to code sections refer to the Internal
Revenue Code, beginning at 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2ooo).
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1 (2007) ("Gross income includes income realized in any form, whether in
money, property or services. Income may be realized, therefore, in the form of services, meals,
accommodations, stock, or other property, as well as in cash.").
41. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 203 (1920).
42. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
43. See, e.g., Phila. Park Amusement Co. v. United States, i26 F. Supp. 184, 188 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
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core refers to the way in which the tax system tracks what part of the
value of a piece of property will not constitute gross income. It generally
refers to the amount of previously taxed dollars invested in the property
that should not be taxed again. As a simple example, suppose I spend
$850 to buy ten shares of Google stock at $85 per share (I disregard
transaction costs in this and all examples in this Article). When I sell the
stock, my wealth has increased only to the extent I get more than $850
out of the sale. The concept of basis in § iooi protects that $850 by
excluding it from the reach of "gross income."'
To determine the extent to which the concept of gross income will
reach in-world transactions, it is important to first examine its historic
limits. To the extent that in-world transactions involve dispositions of
property, then the concepts contained in § iooi, including basis, will also
come into play. Subsection A of this Article will discuss the
constitutional limits on the reach of § 61 and Subsection B will look at
the operational limits.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF INCOME
The Constitution imposes no restrictions on what Congress can tax.45
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 says plainly: "The Congress shall have the
power to lay and collect Taxes, Imposts, Duties, and Excises." The
Constitution does impose limits on how Congress may tax. For example,
Congress cannot exercise its taxing powers in violation of other
constitutional requirements, such as equal protection. 6 Historically, the
44. Likewise, if I buy a car for $25,000, my basis is $25,000. See I.R.C. § 1012. Even if I win a car
worth $25,000 in a lottery, then my basis is also $25,000. See Strong v. Comm'r, 91 T.C. 627, 640 (1988).
This is because I have to report and pay tax on the receipt of the car. I am treated as if I had received a
$25,000 cash prize and then immediately used the money to buy the car. In both cases, if I dispose of
the car and receive more than $25,000 worth of cash, property or services for it, then I report and pay
tax only on the amount greater than my basis of $25,000. If I get less than $25,000 for the car, however,
I cannot deduct the loss unless the car is sufficiently connected to a trade or business activity. See
I.R.C. § 165.
45. For a delightfully tax-centric view of the formation of that document, see CALVIN JOHNSON,
RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: THE MEANING OF THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITuTION 2 (2005)
(arguing that "[t]he Constitution was first a pro-tax document, written to give the federal government
revenue to pay enough of the war debts to restore the public credit so that the federal government
could borrow again in the next emergency"). But see Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth
Amendment and the Meaning of "Incomes," 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1059 (2001) ("[Tjhis Article
continues my challenge to the notion that the taxing power is ... without significant restrictions...
and challenges the generally held notion that the [Sixteenth] Amendment supports an unlimited taxing
power.").
46. See, e.g., United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 226
(1996) (io% "tax" on unfunded pension plans was really a disguised non-pecuniary loss penalty and so
was not entitled to be paid out in bankruptcy at the same priority as a tax); Moritz v. Comm'r, 469 F.2d
466, 470 (0oth Cir. 1972) (finding dependent care deduction invalid for discriminating between
unmarried male and unmarried female taxpayers), cert. denied, Comm'r v. Moritz, 412 U.S. 906 (I973)
; see also Bryan T. Camp, The Equal Protection Problem in Innocent Spouse Procedures, 112 TAX
NOTES 281, 288-90 (20o6).
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most substantive restriction on how Congress could tax has been Article
I, Section 9, Clause 4, which says that any "capitation, or other direct,
Tax" must be made "in proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein
before directed to be taken. '47 This is known as the apportionment rule.
While this clause does not, in theory, forbid imposition of a "direct tax"
(whatever that might be), it has historically doomed such a tax as a
political matter. The Supreme Court has only twice held a tax to be
subject to the apportionment rule, in 1895 and in 1921.48 Neither case
survives today in a form that limits the legal reach of "gross income."
Nonetheless, one needs to understand why these cases now reside in
history's dustbin to understand why transactions occurring wholly within
a virtual world may have real life tax consequences.
The first case was Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., where the
Court held that a tax on income from rental property was a direct tax
subject to apportionment.49 That decision threw into doubt the ability of
Congress to tax any income without apportionment and its political
consequence was to halt application of an income tax on individuals."
Only the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 resolved those
apportionment doubts by authorizing taxation of "incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several
States."5 As a result, if it is "income" then Congress can tax it without
apportionment.
The second time the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional limit
was in its Ozymandian I92i decision, Eisner v. Macomber. No traveler in
tax law can avoid considering this monument to formalism, where the
Court concluded that mere accretion of wealth was not "income" within
the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment and, hence, could not be
"income" within the meaning of the language now in § 61.5 There, Mrs.
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
48. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219 (1920); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. 157
U.S. 429, 607 (1895).
49. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 607 (1895).
50. SELIGMAN, supra note 35, at 586-92. In 1912, even before the Sixteenth Amendment was
ratified by the states, the House of Representatives passed House Bill 21214, which imposed an
"excise" tax on net incomes. See H.R. 21214, 62d Cong. (i982). The measure was rejected by the
Senate in May 1912, but the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment on February 25, 1913, mooted
the issue by allowing Congress to tax incomes directly. See H.R. REP. No. 62-416, at 1-10 (1912). See
generally 93 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1909-1950: THE LAWS, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORIES, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS (Bernard D. Reams, Jr., ed. 1979) (reprinting legislative
documents on H.R. 21214).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. The Supreme Court repeatedly held the constitutional amendment
did not extend the taxing power to new subjects, but merely removed the necessity which otherwise
might exist for an apportionment among the States of taxes laid on income. See Peck & Co. v. Lowe,
247 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1918); Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 112 (I916); Brushaber v.
Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. i, 17-19 (i916).
52. Eisner, 252 U.S. at 219. The practical result of the case was to deny Congress the ability to tax
the amount in question because there was no practical way for Congress to ensure the tax was imposed
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Eisner had received a corporate dividend in the form of additional
corporate stock. 3 The Court held that it was merely an increase in her
capital and not income.54 Thus, to tax the stock dividend was to tax
capital and not income. While Congress could indeed tax it, such a tax
would have to be apportioned and did not come under the Sixteenth
Amendment apportionment exception because what was being taxed was
not "income."55
The Eisner majority identified two constitutional limitations to the
legal reach of "income." The first was about source. The Court opined
that income arose from either of two sources, capital or labor, calling that
the understanding "used in common speech. ' '56 This formulation implied
that increases in wealth not linked to capital or labor or to a concept of
income "used in common speech" could not be income within the scope
of the Sixteenth Amendment. The second limitation, commonly called
the realization requirement, was the real meat of the opinion. An
increase in wealth in the form of additional capital did not become
"income" unless and until it was severed from the capital.57 Until then it
was just appreciation, a "paper" gain. Thus, while a cash dividend was
income, a true stock dividend was not because it left the taxpayer with no
new assets and no change in position with respect to the other owners of
the corporation. While the taxpayer had an increase in wealth, she did
not realize any income from it until she cashed out."
Both of the constitutional barriers to the reach of "gross income"
erected by Eisner (either impliedly or explicitly) have been
systematically dismantled. Later Supreme Court decisions replaced a
formalist notion of income with a more functional concept. The idea that
the source of the economic gain mattered was taken down in 1955 in
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.5" The taxpayer there had been a
in proportion to the population of each state.
53. Id. at 2oo-oi.
54- Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 207 ("After examining dictionaries in common use ... we find little to add to the
succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation Tax Act of I909-'Income may
be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined."'(citations omitted)).
57. Id. ("Here we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital, not a growth or
increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value proceeding
from the property, severed from the capital however invested or employed, and coming in, being
'derived,' that is, received or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and
disposal -that is income derived from property. Nothing else answers the description.").
58. Id. at 211 ("A 'stock dividend' shows that the company's accumulated profits have been
capitalized, instead of distributed to the stockholders or retained as surplus available for distribution
in money or in kind should opportunity offer. Far from being a realization of profits of the
stockholder, it tends rather to postpone such realization, in that the fund represented by the new stock
has been transferred from surplus to capital, and no longer is available for actual distribution.").
59- 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
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plaintiff in a prior lawsuit who did not report as income some $325,000 in
punitive damages it had received. 60 The Third Circuit, relying on the
"common usage" limitation implied by Eisner, accepted the taxpayer's
argument that a punitive damage award was not income because, being a
windfall, it did not derive from either capital or labor and ordinary folks
would not consider it to be income. 6' Refusing to be drawn in to a
metaphysical argument about when and how income "derived" from
capital or labor, the Supreme Court declared that the Eisner definition of
"income" was not to be taken as the "touchstone" of all income
questions. 6' The Court insisted that § 6i contains "no limitations as to the
source of taxable receipts, nor restrictive labels as to their nature. 6 3
Instead of relying on a formalist inquiry as to source, the Court inscribed
into tax law and lore a functional definition of income: since the receipt
of $325,000 was an instance of "undeniable accession[] to wealth, clearly
realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion," it was
64gross income. In so doing, the Court appeared to have aligned the legal
concept of income with an economic concept.
Nor has the second Eisner limitation retained its constitutional
dimension. The idea that income could not include accrued economic
value was hit hard in 194o by the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Bruun.6
There, the taxpayer leased some land on which the tenant built a
building.66 When the tenant defaulted on the lease, the taxpayer got back
the property which now had a valuable building sitting on it.6 Relying on
Eisner, the taxpayer argued that since the termination of the lease did
not (and indeed could not) formally sever the building from the land, all
that had happened was that the underlying property had appreciated in
value.68 What the taxpayer had gotten back was just like a true stock
dividend. The Court rejected that view and found that the appreciation
in the property due to the building was indeed "income" within the
60. Id. at 428.
6i. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 211 F.2d 928, 933 (3d Cir. 1953). In effect, the Third Circuit
punted the entire issue noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has never expressly departed from the
definition of income of Eisner v. Macomber" and that, in fact, "[t]here is as yet no decision which has
adopted the contentions made by the Government here." Id. So, no matter how attractive the
government's position might be, the court concluded that "if such a result is to be achieved after nearly
two decades it should be effected by the Supreme Court and not by this tribunal." Id. at 933-34.
62. Id. at 429.
63. Id..
64. Id. at 431. The Court's holding reflected the intent of the taxwriters who revised the 1939 Tax
Code into the 1954 Tax Code. The House Ways and Means Committee Report noted: "Section 61 (a)
provides that gross income includes 'all income from whatever source derived.' This definition is based
upon the 16th Amendment and the word 'income' is used in its constitutional sense." H. R. REP. No.
82-1337, at 18 (1952).
65. Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (194o).
66. Id. at 464.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 468.
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meaning of the statute.69 The Court said the taxpayer had to report the
value of the building as income in the year the lease terminated and that
the government did not need to wait until the taxpayer took some action
to convert the appreciation into cash.7" To avoid the harsh result (harsh
because it took no account of cash flow), Congress statutorily overruled
Bruun by writing a cash-out rule into the Code. Section Io9 now provides
that "gross income does not include income (other than rent) derived by
a lessor of real property on the termination of a lease." Section ioI9
drops the other shoe: the amount excluded by § lo9 cannot figure into
basis and so will eventually be included in income when the lessor cashes
out by selling or exchanging the property.
The realization requirement imposed by Eisner was permanently
demoted from a constitutional to an administrative requirement in the
Supreme Court's I99I decision of Cottage Savings Ass'n v.
Commissioner.7 There the taxpayer bank had swapped a portfolio of
mortgage loans with another bank's portfolio of loans.7" The taxpayer
had a basis of $6.9 million in the portfolio but because interest rates had
risen dramatically, the stream of income generated by that $6.9 million
could now be generated by a mere $4.5 million.73 Accordingly, the face
value of the taxpayer's portfolio had dropped. The taxpayer figured that
if it swapped its portfolio with another, more recent, set of loans that was
also worth $4.5 million, it could take a $2.4 million loss and still be in the
same economic position as it was before relative to risk of default.74 So in
an attempt to cash out the loss it did the swap. The IRS did not think the
swap of portfolios was a realization event sufficient to trigger the § iooi
calculations because there was no change in economic position by the
bank. It really had not cashed out of anything as evidenced by its strict
compliance with the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's Memorandum
R-49 which approved such deals only when the mortgage loan portfolios
were "substantially identical" such that there was no transfer of risk.7"
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the government's argument,
holding that the realization rule was a tax administration rule.,6 So
69. Id. at 468-69.
70. Id. at 467-68.
71. Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 565 (1991).
72. Id. at 557.
73. See id. at 558.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 557-58. For a good summary of this story, see Scott Lenz, Note, The Symmetry of the
Realization Requirement and Its Application to the "Mortgage Swap" Cases, 9 VA. TAX. REv. 359
(1989).
76. Cottage Sav. Ass'n, 499 U.S. at 565. The Court rejected the government's contention that it
had to evaluate "the attitudes of the parties, the evaluation of the interests by the secondary mortgage
market, and the views of the [Federal Home Loan Bank Board]" to decide whether realization
occurred. Id.
[Vol. 59:1
November 2007] A THEORY OF TAXING VIRTUAL WORLDS
analyzed, the Court thought the swap met the "administrative purposes
underlying the realization requirement in § IOOi(a)" because it resulted
in the parties having "legal entitlements that are different in kind or
extent." 77 The test was thus whether there was an ascertainable,
reportable, and, verifiable change in legal relations: "as long as the
property entitlements are not identical, their exchange will allow both
the Commissioner and the transacting taxpayer easily to fix the
appreciated or depreciated values of the property relative to their tax
b a s e s .
'78
Thus, the history of § 61 demonstrates that courts have interpreted
the term "gross income" dynamically, giving it ever increasing reach.79
Since Eisner, no competent federal court has found a constitutional
limitation on what Congress can treat as "gross income."" And yet the
reach is indeed limited, limited by the practicalities of tax administration.
B. OPERATIONAL LIMITS ON LEGAL CONCEPT OF INCOME
Despite the constitutional carte blanche, significant operational
issues limit the reach of § 61. These operational limits are reflected in
statutes, case law, and administrative rules. Wherever found, they arise
from the functional requirements of administering the law to a
population of over 130 million taxpayers and ensuring compliance with
the law.8 While it might seem that Glenshaw Glass Co. brought the legal
definition of income in line with an economic concept of income, the
77. Id.
78. Id. The Court did not address exactly how much of a change in legal entitlements would be
needed to constitute realization of income (or loss) nor did it explain why, if realization was merely an
administrative concern, it should not defer to the IRS judgment of when realization had occurred. I
discuss the realization requirement in more detail below.
79. See, e.g., United States v. James, 333 F.zd 748, 753 (9th Cir. 1964) (en banc) (emphasizing the
flexible nature of gross income and overruling prior cases on whether certain distributions from
decedent's estate were gross income), cert. denied, James v. United States, 379 U.S. 932 (r964). See
generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
80. For a brief moment, in an amazing display of technical ineptitude, a three-judge panel of the
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia held in 2006 that money received for emotional and
reputational damages was not "income" within the meaning of the constitutional term and so it was
unconstitutional for Congress not to exclude it under § 104(a)(2). Murphy v. IRS, 460 F.3d 79, 92
(D.C. Cir. 2006). While one might be sympathetic to a policy argument for exclusion, the legal
reasoning of the panel was downright embarrassing. For the scathing commentary of the tax law
community, see Sheryl Stratton, Experts Ponder Murphy Decision's Many Flaws, 112 TAX NOTES 822,
822-25 (2oo6). The panel then vacated its decision sua sponte and ordered a panel rehearing. Murphy
v. IRS, No. 05-5139 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006) (vacating judgment and scheduling case for oral
argument). The panel then reversed its earlier conclusion, although its opinion was still criticized as
"sanctimonious crapola." See TaxProf Blog, http://taxprof.typepad.comltaxprof__blog/2o07/07/tax-
profs-disse.html#comments (July 6, 2007).
81. In FY2oo6, the IRS received and processed over 177 million income tax returns. Since many
were joint returns, the actual number of taxpayers is much higher. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T
OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 206, at 4 tbl.2 (2006) [hereinafter IRS,
DATA BOOK 2OO6].
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practicalities of tax administration prevent "gross income" from ever
reaching as far as the economic concept. This is because, unlike
economics or other social sciences, laws do not merely describe or
explain phenomena. Laws shape behavior and so laws must create rules
that people-both those subject to the law and those who must
administer it-can follow. "It is the essence of any system of taxation that
it should produce revenue ascertainable, and payable to the government,
at regular intervals. ' ' 2 Laws must also create rules that can be enforced.
Hence, discussion of tax theory-including any normative discussion-
cannot be divorced from implementation.
Practical operational issues have a profound influence on the legal
concept of income and yet the interplay of tax administration and the law
is significantly undertheorzed." The genius of the American political
order is the recognition that human nature rarely aspires to perfection.84
The genius of the American economic order is the recognition that
human nature rarely places communal interest above self-interest. 5 The
genius of the American tax system rests on the same insights. Our
enviable compliance rate of almost 84%86 relies on a discipline of self-
reporting income supported by appeals to human greed (through over-
withholding at the source) and fear (of being caught through third-party
reporting and audit)."s This system will break down when it demands
82. Bumet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 365 (1931).
83. See Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm Shift
in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. I, 2 (2004); see also Leandra
Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 6o STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2o07) (exploring how operational concerns make sense of otherwise theoretically
incoherent distinction between treatment of reimbursed and unreimbursed employee expenses).
84. James Madison provides the classic analysis. See THE FEDERALIST No. Io (James Madison).
However, Hamilton's analysis should also not be overlooked. See THE FEDERALIST No. 6 (Alexander
Hamilton).
85. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(1776), reprinted in 39 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 192 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed.,
1952).
86. A Closer Look at the Size and Sources of the Tax Gap: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On
Taxation and I.R.S. Oversight of the S. Comm. on Fin., Io9th Cong. (20o6) (written testimony of Mark
J. Mazur, I.R.S. Director, Research, Analysis, and Statistics), available at http://finance.senate.gov/
hearings/testimony/2005test/0726o6mm.pdf [hereinafter Hearings] (explaining how the IRS arrived at
the 84% compliance estimate).
87. See generally Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial
Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 998, 56 FLA. L. REV. t, 5-6 (2OO4) ("The
tax determination process ultimately rests on taxpayers disclosing their financial affairs and paying
what they owe-through withholding or otherwise-without overt government compulsion. It is
'voluntary' in the same sense that stopping one's car at a red light-at midnight with no traffic and no
one looking-is voluntary. It is each citizen's self-enforcement of the legal duty that keeps both the tax
and transportation systems running smoothly."). Congress has long recognized this feature:
Withholding improves voluntary compliance for several reasons. First ... any incentive a
taxpayer had to conceal or overlook the income... is reduced or converted to an incentive
to report the income and claim the withholding credit. Second... information reports...
are significantly more accurate .... Finally, withholding serves as an effective reminder to
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taxpayers report income that is unreportable, pay tax on "phantom"
income which has produced no means of payment, or makes suckers out
of compliant taxpayers by imposing requirements that are practically
unenforceable against noncompliant taxpayers.
The operational task is thus to find an administrable concept of
''gross income," a legal definition that can be applied in a uniform and
coherent manner and that allows income to be reliably measured,
reported, and paid. That task requires a basic appreciation of the bulk-
processing nature of tax administration in modern society. After all,
while § i imposes the tax and leads back, through § 63, to the base
definition of "gross income" in § 6I, none of those statutes impose the
duty to report or pay the tax imposed by the statute, as the tax protestor
community repeatedly delights in pointing out.f The payment duty is
imposed by § 6151 and the reporting duty by § 6oI2(a)(I)(A), which
requires "every individual having gross income which equals or exceeds
the exemption amount" to make a return.
89
Operationally, tax administration depends upon taxpayers returning
to the government a yearly report of the income tax consequences of
their financial transactions. This is done on a document called a "return."
Given that the IRS processed over 177 million income tax returns and
over 1.56 billion information returns in FY2oo6, one quickly sees why
Congress has delegated to the IRS the power to regulate the reporting
requirement.' The delegation appears in § 6oi I which instructs taxpayers
taxpayers that the payments ... should be reported as income.
S. REP. No. 97-53o, at 228 (t982) (explaining revisions to withholding requirements on interest and
dividends). Hand in hand with withholding walks the fear-based Benthemite principle of surveillance.
Third-party payors become the eyes of the government by sending in reports of payments made to
taxpayers. Taxpayers whose income is subject to third party reporting, such as wages, report over 99%
of their gross income. In contrast, income subject to little third-party reporting or withholding, is
correctly reported only about 43% of the time. See Hearings, supra note 86. Appeals to greed and fear
are further evidenced by the 2oo7 Turbo Tax contest on YouTube for a "tax rap" praising YouTube.
YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/contestrTheTaxRap (last visited Oct. 31, 2007). After viewing
approximately 120 of the 370 submitted raps, my admittedly impressionistic conclusion is that the tax
refund is widely perceived as something akin to a windfall, with raps repeatedly referring to Turbo
Tax's ability to maximize refunds. The pitch is not "get more of your money back" but "get more
money."
88. See, e.g., Newman v. Schiff, 778 F.2d 46o, 467 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding unenforceable Schiff's
unilateral promise to pay $ioo,ooo to the person who could first show him the statute that required
taxpayers to pay taxes).
89. The "exemption amount" is $3,400 for tax year 2007. James C. Young, Inflation Adjustments
Affecting Individual Taxpayers in 2007, 113 TAX NoTEs 157, 159 (2006). Section 6oi2(a)(i)(D) says the
term "exemption amount" has the meaning given to it by § 15x(d), which in turn defined the
"exemption amount" as a base of $2,000, to be adjusted for inflation after 1989.
9o. See IRS, DATA BOOK 2006, supra note 81, at 4 tbl.2, 37 tbl.I4 (income returns and information
returns); see also Parker v. Comm'r, 365 F.2d 792, 800 (8th Cir. 1966) ("The Commissioner is certainly
not required to accept any facsimile the taxpayer sees fit to submit. If the Commissioner were
obligated to do so, the business of tax collecting would result in insurmountable confusion."). It should
not be surprising that Congress would leave such matters to the agency's discretion. Congress
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to use the "forms and regulations prescribed by" the IRS and to report
the "information required by such forms or regulations." The regulations
in turn tell taxpayers to use the famous Form I040.9' And so it is on the
Form 1040 that the concept of "gross income" takes tangible, practical
form.
The entire first section of the Form 1040 (lines seven through
twenty-two in the 2oo6 Form) is devoted to asking taxpayers for detailed
information about their income (usually their gross income, although
some lines ask for income net of expenses), with the penultimate line
being a catch-all for "other income." Once taxpayers report their gross
income, they then take various deductions to eventually arrive at their
"taxable income."
To many economists, the Form 1040 is exactly backwards in asking
taxpayers to report their income first. Economists generally conceive of
income as what results from changes in consumption and wealth over the
reporting period; it's the residual. The most often quoted formulation is
that of Henry C. Simons: "Personal income may be defined as the
algebraic sum of (I) the market value of rights exercised in consumption
and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between
the beginning and end of the period in question."9 While Simons'
formula is not the only one and has been criticized as itself incomplete, it
is still the view most widely taught and serves as well as any other to
illustrate the gap between economic theory and administrative
practicality.93
This economic view of income does not translate well into tax law
because it ignores the practical requirement that income be something
that can be reliably measured, reported, and paid. For present purposes,
routinely delegates enormous discretionary powers to agencies. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (collecting cases on delegation). Here Congressional delegation allows
the IRS to administer the tax laws as far as practicable.
91. If none is available, the regulations allow taxpayers to submit a "statement ... disclosing...
gross income and the deductions therefrom." Treas. Reg. § 1.6oI2-i(b) (as amended in 1967). That
statement will be treated as a tentative return-thus meeting the taxpayer's reporting obligation-so
long as the taxpayer sends in the proper form "without unnecessary delay." Id.
92. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938). A failure to appreciate the
relationship of the three terms may in fact lead a government to the fallacy of John Morton's famous
fork. Morton, appointed Lord Chancellor of England in 1487, reputedly said, "If the subject is seen to
live frugally, tell him because he is clearly a money saver of great ability he can afford to give
generously to the King. If, however, the subject lives a life of great extravagance, tell him he, too, can
afford to give largely, the proof of his opulence being evident in his expenditure." John Morton-
Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JohnMorton#_note-Powicke85, (last
visited Oct. 31, 2007).
93. I recognize, of course, that the theories I attribute to "economists" as a class are not held by
all, either historically or currently. In fact, some might be a minority position, depending on the
universe of folks you count as "economists." But, at least in my academic experience, I have
repeatedly encountered these views and while I recognize that I'm being necessarily reductionist, I do
not believe I am unfairly so. Should you disagree, please feel free to let me know.
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what makes Simons' economic formula unhelpful for the law is that it
measures income indirectly: only after determining consumption and
wealth does one determine income. That is not only implicit in the
structure of the equation, with income being the defined term, but
Simons himself also made the point: "We do best, in general, to regard
income not as something accruing or flowing with time-for such
language is dangerously figurative-but merely as a result imputed to
particular periods."'"
Simons' "best" has no grounding in administrative reality. In fact,
current tax doctrine-as expressed in statutes, cases, and interpreted in
administrative guidance - contains three operational limits, or
exceptions, to what taxpayers must include as "gross income" on the
Form 1040 which have as little to do with coherent economic theory as
they do with constitutional theory. Rather, all three limits represent
instances of economic income that are not treated as gross income
because they present significant operational problems-whether of
measurement, payment, or compliance. These doctrinal limits promote
the self-reporting discipline necessary for modern tax administration by
preventing government over-reach when income is too difficult to
measure, too difficult to pay, or would require intolerable government
intrusion into individual lives. The limits are: (i) "priceless" income for
which there is no ascertainable fair market value; (2) "unrealized"
income derived from appreciation of property; and (3) "imputed"
income which arises from self-benefiting activity or the use of self-owned
property. I shall discuss each in turn.
i. Priceless
The legal concept of income demands a readily ascertainable fair
market value. Taxpayers cannot report as "gross income" an economic
abstraction. This idea is plastered throughout the regulations governing
what items constitute reportable income. For example, Treasury
Regulation section 1.6i-2(d) requires "the fair market value" of property
or services received as compensation "must be included in income."
Treasury Regulation section 1.61-14 provides that found property,
known as treasure trove, constitutes gross income "to the extent of its
value in United States currency" when reduced to undisputed possession.
Treasury Regulation section 1.74-I(a)(2) requires that prizes and awards
be reported as income to the extent of their "fair market value." The
legal requirement for "fair market value" presupposes some objective
method of valuation, some way that the tax system can verify what the
taxpayer reports.' If there is no objective market value, if the value of an
94. SIMONS, supra note 92, at ioo.
95. See Brian Hirsch, Comment, The Extreme Home Renovation Giveaway: Constructive
Justification for Tax-Free Home Improvements on ABC's Extreme Makeover: Home Edition. 73 U.
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item cannot be reduced to a readily ascertainable value in United States
currency, there is no reportable income.
The idea is encapsulated by the popular commercial for Mastercard.
If an employer rewarded an employee with a night on the town on his or
her birthday, the resulting commercial might go something like this:
"Rental of Limo for the evening: $300. Dinner for two at 'Le Chic' : $200.
Front row tickets to Rolling Stones concert: $500. Mick Jagger asking
you onstage and singing 'Happy Birthday' to you: Priceless." The
evening results in $i,ooo gross income to the employee and not a dime
more. Even though the "market value of rights exercised in
consumption" that night is greater than $i,ooo, one simply cannot reduce
the experience of Mick Jagger singing "Happy Birthday" to a fair market
value.
Priceless moments occur much more often than a Mick Jagger
serenade. Watching one's daughter tie her shoes for the first time or
seeing one's son play his first recital are priceless moments. So may be
any number of other unique moments in life obtainable only in the
absence of performing work for pay." Accordingly, the personal choice
not to work for hire is priceless.
For some economists, however, "the ideal measure of income would
include leisure and would include in 'consumption' all goods and services
that are components of the utility function."' To these economists, the
economic value of leisure is easy to measure: it's your foregone wage.
Thus one could view the parent who chooses to work twenty hours
instead of forty hours per week as simply placing a higher economic
value on being with the kids than the market places on his or her labor.
One might therefore argue that a parent whose labor could command
$io per hour therefore has income of at least $200 from choosing to
forgo twenty hours of work, and a parent whose labor could command
CIN. L. REV. 1665, j671-76 (2005) (reviewing case law and methods of objective valuations and
exceptions thereto).
96. But see WILLIAM SYDNEY PORTER, MAMMON AND THE ARCHER, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF 0.
HENRY 53 (1953).
97. Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45, 52 (I99o). Thuronyi refers to
Henry Simons, a distinguished economist of the early 2oth century. Id. Simons is no outlier:
As Haig stated, "[m]odern economic analysis recognizes that fundamentally income is a
flow of satisfactions, of intangible psychological experiences." According to Professor
Aaron, comprehensive income would include a household's consumption of goods and
services provided by governments and nonprofit institutions. Professor Aaron argues that
the Simons definition of income is arbitrary because it leaves out these elements of
consumption. Simons would not, I think, have disputed this conclusion, but might have
argued that omitting public goods and services is not fatal so long as they are distributed
roughly in line with income. Under the traditional view of economists, the basis for the
concept of income is obvious: Income is a measure of the economic utility experienced by
the individual, the only issue being whether the underinclusiveness of the Simons definition
is fatal to its validity. Professor Koppelman's recent suggestion that income should be
considered as a measure of economic well-being is in line with this tradition.
Id. (citations omitted).
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$40 per hour has income of $800.
While one could think of time in terms of money and so believe that
time with the kids indeed has an economic value that can be expressed in
dollar terms, the practical valuation problems make the idea unpalatable
as sound basis for the legal definition of income. To the extent it
encourages people to behave like rational wealth maximizers, it is poor
social policy: as first year associates at large law firms quickly learn,
thinking of every waking hour of the day as money earned or lost causes
one's life to become-literally-unbalanced." Worse, the economist's
view creates significant valuation problems, not the least of which is
between hourly-wage taxpayers and those on fixed incomes or salaries,
and as between higher-earning and lower-earning parents, of how to tax
the choice of which parent forgoes the twenty hours per week.
Thus, while time may be money in economic theory, it not so viewed
by tax law, nor should it be. The legal concept of income departs from
the economic concept here because valuation of the non-working time
spent at leisure is subjective to each taxpayer and not amenable to
market analysis. Time spent in leisure activity simply does not "produce
revenue ascertainable, and payable to the government, at regular
intervals.""
Some items of economic income may not be exactly priceless, but
may be too difficult to link to a fair market value to qualify as legal
"income." Frequent flyer miles provide a concrete example of this
operational limit. Many taxpayers travel on business with the travel paid
for by their employer. They then receive credit for the travel in their
personal frequent flyer accounts. Once they accumulate a certain number
of miles or points, they can exchange them for free travel, as their
personal needs or wants might dictate. If taxpayers cash out their miles,
such as by billing a customer for a first class seat, but purchasing a coach
class seat and using frequent flyer miles to upgrade to first class, the IRS
will argue (and win) that they have income to the extent of the difference
in value between the cost of the first class seat and the cost of the coach
seat."° In such instances, they have translated their miles into dollars in a
way that is ascertainable and reviewable. The actual transaction shows
(and defines) the market.
Short of cashing out, however, it is all but impossible to find a
reliably objective method to assign a fair market value to miles in a
frequent flyer account.'0 ' First, there is an issue of the relevant market.' 2
98. This point is made repeatedly in the literature on the subject. For one excellent treatment, see
Susan Saab Fortney, The Billable Hours Derby: Empirical Data on the Problems and Pressure Points.,
33 FORDHAM URI. L.J. 171 (2005).
99. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 365 (i931).
1oo. See Charley v. Comm'r, 91 F.3d 72,74 (9th Cir. 1996).
ioi. See The Taxability of Frequent Flyer Credits Earned by Employees: Why the IRS has
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In most programs, frequent flyer miles can be redeemed in multiple
markets apart from air travel. They can be redeemed for hotel stays,
rental cars, and various types of merchandise. Second, even as to air
travel, the market value of a flight between two points varies
dramatically in response to market demand, oil prices, union strikes, time
of day flown, type of aircraft available and assigned for the flight,
competing carrier decisions, and a host of other factors that combine to
cause almost hourly fluctuation in prices. Third, there is no robust
secondary market for flyer miles because most contracts between carriers
and flyers make the miles inalienable."3 Fourth, there is currently no way
to determine a taxpayer's basis in a set of miles cashed out. Flyers should
get basis in miles purchased with their after-tax dollars but not in miles
that are effectively received from their employers tax-free. But airlines
do not track basis in their customers' accounts nor could they do so
without elaborate changes to track both the source of acquisition of miles
and their redemption as "personal" or "business" and cooperation by
flyers to report to the airline how much of a trip is being reimbursed by
someone else, or is used for business and not personal reasons. 4
Requiring such recordkeeping and reporting by taxpayers is
administratively unpalatable. 5
Accordingly, while frequent flyer miles have economic value and
their accumulation is an "accretion of wealth" within the economic
meaning of "gross income," the impossibility of determining their fair
market value led the IRS, in Announcement 2002-18, to assure taxpayers
that it would not assert that a taxpayer had "understated his federal tax
liability by reason of the receipt or personal use of frequent flyer miles or
other in-kind promotional benefits attributable to the taxpayer's business
or official travel."' 6
Remained Silent on the Issue, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 643, 650 (2002). For a very good review of the
literature on frequent flyer miles, see id. This paragraph summarizes the same literature she reviews.
102. Id.
103. Like RMT, however, determined flyers find ways to sell. While such a cash out transaction
creates income, it does not create a "market" sufficiently transparent to form an objective basis for
valuation of all miles.
104. Some commentators have suggested abandoning the attempt to find a fair market value and
instead advocate assigning a uniform value to all miles. See, e.g., Dominic L. Daher, The Proposed
Federal Taxation of Frequent Flyer Miles Received from Employers: Good Tax Policy but Bad Politics,
I6 AKRON TAX J. I, i8-i9 (2001) (advocating a cents-per-mile approach). The IRS takes such an
approach in valuing fringe benefit flights, for example. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21 (g)-(h) (as amended in
1992). Although this bright line sword may cut through the knotty valuation problem, it does not help
with the basis problem or the associated recordkeeping problem.
1O5. Imposing such recordkeeping burdens on taxpayers has long been thought to decrease
voluntary compliance. See Deborah H. Schenk, Simplification for Individual Taxpayers: Problems and
Proposals, 45 TAX L. REV. 121, 166-67 (1989) (discussing how complex recordkeeping requirements
are commonly thought to breed noncompliance).
io6. I.R.S. Announcement 2002-18, 2002-I C.B. 621.
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2. Realization
The realization requirement boils down to timing. Before an
accession to wealth is reportable as gross income, it must be realized7
This requirement mediates between the economic idea of income and the
practical needs of a system dependent on periodic reporting of
transactions that may or may not have closed. It has less to do with
economic theory and more to do with finding an administrable legal
concept of gross income.08 What constitutes a "realization event" is a
practical inquiry which has turned out to be significantly path-
dependent."° Generally, both case law and statutes are concerned that an
107. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426,431 955).
io8. See Deborah H. Schenk, A Positive Account of the Realization Rule, 57 TAX L. REV. 355, 396
(2004) (concluding that "[s]ince neither an accrual tax or a pure realization rule is tolerable, the task
for policymakers is to determine where along the continuum to draw the line"). The fissure between
lawyers and economists on this point dates back to the early 2oth century, when economists ignored
the idea of realization and legal treatise writers treated it as a given. It is not that either group is wrong
in an absolute sense. They just ask different questions. The answer to whether some increase in wealth
constitutes "income" depends on why you want to know. Those who study economics have one
answer. Those who have to collect taxes have another.
io9. The American legal system depends on a concept of judicial precedent where the outcome of
one case determines the range of potential outcomes in later cases. This is true even for highly codified
areas of law like tax. An outcome in an earlier case may well block one or more paths to alternative
outcomes in future cases. Actions by other legal institutions, such as Congress and the IRS, also affect
the range of potential outcomes. One valuable service traditionally provided by the legal academy has
been to expand the range of available choices by discovering new analytical paths for courts to use
when addressing recurring issues. A good example of this dynamic between Congress, courts,
commentators, and the IRS is found in Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 301-02 (1983), where the
Court wrestled with how to treat relief from a non-recourse debt. Professor Wayne G. Barnett of
Stanford had marked out the best approach to the problem, but the Court declined to adopt it. Id. at
310-12, 312 n.ii. The majority agreed that the IRS approach, adopted by the Court in Crane v.
Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1(947), had significant problems, notably that it "laid the foundation stone
of most tax shelters." Tufts, 461 U.S. at 309 n.7 (citing Boris I. Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt,
and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REv. 277, 283 (983)). But while "a different approach might have been
taken," the Court would "express no view as to whether such an approach would be consistent with
the statutory structure." Tufts, 461 U.S. at 308, 308 n.5 . It was just too late in the day because the
government had pressed its case on ground already well trod. The Court would not deviate from the
path previously chosen by the IRS and blessed by the Court. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
explained why the Court accepted a "second best" resolution of the issue:
Persuaded though I am by the logical coherence and internal consistency of
[Prof. Barnett's] approach, I agree with the Court's decision not to adopt it
judicially. We do not write on a slate marked only by Crane. The
Commissioner's longstanding position... is now reflected in the regulations. In
the light of the numerous cases in the lower courts including the amount of the
unrepaid proceeds of the mortgage in the proceeds on sale or disposition ... it is
difficult to conclude that the Commissioner's interpretation of the statute
exceeds the bounds of his discretion. As the Court's opinion demonstrates, his
interpretation is defensible. One can reasonably read § iooI(b)'s reference to
"the amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property" ... to
permit the Commissioner to collapse the two aspects of the transaction. As long
as his view is a reasonable reading of § iooI(b), we should defer to the
regulations promulgated by the agency charged with interpretation of the
statute ... Accordingly, I concur.
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event sufficiently "locks in" an objectively measurable increase in wealth
before it be deemed a realization of income."' While realization is
typically considered in the context of determining income from property,
it also comes into play in determining gross income from services. I shall
discuss the latter first, and then the former.
a. Realization of Income from Services
As to services, realization of income occurs when a taxpayer
receives, directly or indirectly, cash, property, or services in exchange for
past, present, or future services (a.k.a. labor)."' Neither labor nor the
potential for labor contained in every taxpayer is itself considered wealth
(at least under current cultural conditions). It is instead the engine of
wealth; one's labor increases one's wealth only by the value of what is
received, whether cash, property, or return services.
Barter transactions provide a good example of the concept of
realization and its tie to tax administration. Consider the following
transactions between two taxpayers, Lilly and Kunal."2 Lilly is a lawyer
who generally charges $9oo to prepare a basic will. Kunal is a skilled
carpenter. He wants a will. She wants a bathroom cabinet.
Transaction I (cash). Kunal pays Lilly $9oo cash to prepare his will.
Under § 6i Lilly has realized $9oo gross income because she now has
cash she did not have, and there are few economic gains more readily
ascertainable than cash. Kunal meanwhile, has received $9oo worth of
legal services, in the form of a will, but since he consumed an equal
amount of wealth to do it he has not actualized any increase in wealth
and so has realized no income under § 61. Lilly uses the $9oo to buy a
new bathroom cabinet for her home at Home Depot. The new bathroom
Id. at 317,319-20 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
I1o. See Scott Lenz, Note, The Symmetry of the Realization Requirement and its Application to the
"Mortgage Swap" Cases, 9 VA. TAx. REV. 359, 360-75 (1989) (reviewing case law, and providing a lucid
review of the history of the realization rule). Tax scholars generally agree that the realization
requirement
is essentially a rule of administrative convenience premised on not
inconsequential problems. It is founded on three concerns that, according to
Treasury, "taken together, appear to be insurmountable." They are: "(I) the
administrative burden of annual reporting; (2) the difficulty and cost of
determining asset values annually; and (3) the potential hardship of obtaining
the funds to pay taxes on accrued but unrealized gains.
Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A "Revolutionary"
Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX L. REV. 725, 742-43 (1992) (citing DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
BLUEPRINTS FOR BAsic TAX REFORM 81 (1977)).
III. Treas. Reg. § 1.6i-2(d) (as amended in 2003); Rev. Rul. 83-163, 1983-2 C.B. 26 (taxpayer
realized income in the year they received services in even though it was in exchange for future
services) (citing Schlude v. Comm'r, 372 U.S. 128 (1963)). The receipt may be actual or constructive.
Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (as amended in 1979). Realization of loss would happen when the transaction
produces an economic decrease in wealth.
112. These are fictional characters and any resemblance to real, actual Lillys or Kunals is
coincidental.
[Vol. 59:1I
November 2007] A THEORY OF TAXING VIRTUAL WORLDS
cabinet increases the value of her home, but since she spent $9oo for it, it
does not represent a realization of any economic gain. She just traded
one form of wealth for another.
Transaction 2 (direct barter). Kunal builds a bathroom cabinet for
Lilly in exchange for her preparing his will. Lilly here realizes $900 of
gross income because she receives services worth $900."' She has, in
effect, transformed her "wealth" of knowledge about the law into a
bathroom cabinet. That the economic gain is in the form of a bathroom
cabinet is irrelevant; gross income can be in any form."4 It is as if Kunal
paid her $900 cash and then she turned around and paid Kunal $900 cash
to build the cabinet. Viewed this way, one quickly sees how Kunal has
now realized income, too. He is wealthier by $900 because he did not
spend any of his wealth to get the will. He spent only his labor and the
realization event is the receipt of the will which actualizes the economic
value of his carpentry skills."5
Transaction 3 (complex barter). Kunal and Lilly belong to a barter
exchange or barter club. Through the club, Kunal installs windows for
another member, and then later purchases Lilly's will-preparation
services. To join the barter club both Kunal and Lilly have signed a
Terms of Service (TOS) agreement with the club owner, George, and
they pay George a monthly membership fee of $20. For that fee, George
creates a trading account for them and they receive an equal number of
"Trade Credit Dollars" (TC$) in their account (i.e. TC$2o per month).
They can use those TC$ to receive goods and services offered by other
members and George takes a io% commission for brokering the deal.
Thus, if another member and Kunal agree for Kunal to install windows
for $i,ooo, George will move TC$i,ooo from the buyer's account to
Kunal's account. In addition, George will also transfer another TC$ioo
from the buyer's account to his own account. In this way Kunal pays Lilly
113. See Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-I C.B. 6o. Lilly's income is the value of the services provided, not
the resulting value to her home. See the analysis in I.R.S. Chief Counsel Advisory 2oo43I012 (July 30,
2004), available at 2004 WL 1701305, at *8 (holding that taxpayers who receive structural
improvements under federal programs to elevate structures located on flood-prone properties must
"include in income the value of the services being provided by the contractor, not the amount by
which the value of the property is increased due to the elevation").
114. Treas. Reg. § i.61-2(d)(i) (stating that when services are paid for with other services or
property, the fair market value of the other services or property taken in payment must be included in
income). Case law creates a very strong presumption that the exchange is of equal fair market value so
that if the value of one side of the swap is known (here, the $900 for will preparation), that value will
be attributed to the side of the exchange. Phila. Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp.
184, 188 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
115. Note that this is why a loan repaid by services results in the borrower realizing income in the
amount of the loan so repaid. The initial loan of money is not deemed a realization event because the
law both obligates and expects the debtor to repay the money with future wealth. Zarin v. Comm'r,
916 F.2d 110, I 15 (3d Cir. 199o). If the debtor repays with property or services, those transactions
represent separate realization events which must be accounted for.
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TC$9oo for the will (and also pays TC$9o to George).
In transaction 3, Kunal, Lilly, and George all realize income at the
time when George credits the various accounts with TC$."6 This is
because the Trade Credits function like cash, which can be viewed as
simply the stored value of goods and services it can purchase."7 Kunal
does not have to wait to get his will until some lawyer needs carpentry
work. He can instead actualize the economic value of his carpentry skills
into a form (Trade Credits) that he can use immediately to procure a will
or almost anything else he wants in life. Like the receipt of any medium
of exchange, the receipt of TC$ represents a fully realized accession to
wealth. It is a cash-equivalent.
Bartering illustrates the connection between realization and tax
administration, and the tax system's potential response to human activity
in virtual worlds. Bartering represents as much of a realization event as a
transaction conducted in cash: in both situations a readily identifiable
event (a market transaction) has occurred in which the taxpayer has
actualized theretofore implicit wealth. Taxpayers consequently have a
duty to report that transaction. But in the absence of cash, taxpayers may
not understand they have reportable income and, if they do understand,
may have difficulty in setting aside cash from other transactions to pay
the resulting tax. Thus, when bartering is done informally and directly
between taxpayers, there may be a high level of noncompliance in
reporting the income received. Since it is very difficult to conduct one's
affairs through direct barter, direct bartering occurs at a very low level,
peripheral to the economy. Accordingly, with no systemic compliance
issue, there is no administrative pressure to police these transactions
systemically. Even though a few folks may escape reporting their
economic gain as gross income, the leakage is small enough that it does
6. Barter Sys., Inc. v. Comm'r, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 72, 77 (i99o) (barter club realized income from
commissions received in trade units, as well as property received from members in exchange for trade
units); Rev. Rul. 80-52, i98o-I C.B. ioo (barter club members realized income in "the taxable year in
which the credit units are credited to their accounts," when such trade units "can be used immediately
to purchase goods or services offered by other members of the club," and could be sold or transferred
to another member of the club). The amount of income received will depend on the fair market value
of the TC$. Compare Baker v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1282, 1286 (1987) (finding each trade unit worth
US$i), with Evans v. Comm'r, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 3001, 3003 (1992) (IRS failed to prove fair market
value of trade units was more than US$0.50), and Wright v. Comm'r, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 215, 216 (1984)
(parties stipulated that each trade unit was worth US$o.67).
I17. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS,
reprinted in 39 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 123 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952).
I 8. For example, in support of its petition to enforce a John Doe summons against a barter club,
the IRS provided evidence that approximately 50% of audited taxpayers who participated in barter
clubs failed to report income from their bartering activities. United States v. Coble, 82-2 U.S. Tax
Cases (CCH) I 9506, at 84,815 (S.D. Iowa June 2, 1982). See generally Hearings, supra note 87
(reporting results of IRS compliance study showing that the 57% of taxpayers who are not subject to
third-party reporting under-report their income).
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not present significant issues of nonuniformity or incoherence in the law;
it does not make suckers out of honest taxpayers.
Complex barter does create such problems as was seen when
bartering became more regularized and connected to the wider economy
in the mid 197os, chiefly through the organization of formal barter
clubs."9 By 1982, the value of goods and services exchanged through
barter clubs had been growing by approximately 20% per year for about
six years and was estimated to involve some sixty thousand barter club
members exchanging some $300 million annually.' This activity now
presented a significant uniformity issue for tax administration in that the
high level of non-compliance by barter club members made suckers out
of honest taxpayers.
The IRS response to barter transactions was similar to the response
to frequent flyer mile transactions: in both cases, the taxing authorities
attempted to increase the uniformity of tax administration through a
decision about the substantive tax issue. However, whereas the valuation
issue of frequent flyer miles led the IRS to allow all taxpayers to omit
them from gross income, barter transactions presented no such
administerability problem. Accordingly, both the IRS and Congress
moved to increase the uniformity of reporting barter transactions as
gross income. The IRS established programs in 1979 to target barter
members for audit and thus enforce the law on the back end.'2' In 1982
Congress amended § 6045 to require barter club owners to send the IRS
information returns and thus enforce the law on the front end.'"
b. Realization of Income from Property
As to property, it helps to understand that there are two ways
property produces gross income. First, simply owning a piece of property
might generate income. A taxpayer who owns stocks realizes income
from dividends generated by the stock shares. A taxpayer who owns a
duplex and rents it out realizes income from the rental payments. A
taxpayer who owns bonds has income with each payment of interest.
I19. See Robert I. Keller, The Taxation of Barter Transactions, 67 MINN. L. REV. 441, 485-512
(1982).
120. Id. at 485 (citing 128 Cong. Rec. 5831 (1982) (statement of Sen. Baucus)).
121. See United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., Inc., 644 F.2d 302, 3o7-08 (3d Cir. 198t)
(rejecting barter club owner's contention that IRS research program targeting barter clubs rendered
its John Doe summons unenforceable); In re Tax Liabs. of Does, 671 F.2d 977, 979-80 (6th Cir. t982)
(same); Coble, 82-2 USTC 1 9506, at 84,816 (IRS issued John Doe summons to barter club to obtain
membership lists in order to obtain information on who to audit).
122. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 6oo, § 311(a)(i).
Treas. Reg. § i.6o45-I(c)(5) (as amended in 2006) imposes the requirement whenever there are more
than one hundred exchanges in a year. The regulations deal with the measurement issue by deeming a
barter exchange's "stipulated price" to be the fair market value of the exchange. Treas. Reg. § 1.62-
2(d) (199o). Professor Keller discusses this concept in The Taxation of Barter Transactions, supra note
119, at 456-57.
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Second, property may produce income when it is sold, exchanged, or
otherwise disposed of. The shareholder may realize a gain on the sale of
the stock shares. The landlord may realize a gain on the sale of the
duplex. The bondholder may realize a gain on redemption of the bond.'23
As to the first way of receiving income from property, the realization
event is the actual or constructive receipt of the income by the person
who owns the income-producing property. Commissioner v. Horst
concerned the question of who was taxed on bond interest paid to a son
based on coupons given him by his father.'24 The Court held that the
father had to pay tax even though the cash actually flowed to the son
because the father owned the bond that produced the income.'25 The
Court linked the concept of realization to the owner of the property with
this reasoning: "The power to dispose of income is the equivalent of
ownership of it. The exercise of that power to procure the payment of
income to another is the enjoyment, and hence the realization, of the
income by him who exercises it."''2 6 But that holding did not change the
fact that the realization event is the payment of the income produced by
the property. It just decided that upon the realization event of payment, it
was the owner who had actualized his economic gain, not the son. 7
Thus, the owner of property is not deemed to have exercised the power
to distribute income until the year the cash flows. 8
The second way of receiving income from property is governed by
§ I00I. Its regulations require that the realization event result in the
receipt of either cash or of "property differing materially either in kind
or in extent.' 2.9 Thus, the focus is on finding a suitably identifiable legal
event by which the taxpayer actualizes the economic abstraction of
appreciation.'30 One can read Macomber as deciding only that a payment
123. This distinction is expressed often in the case law. Compare, e.g., Hort v. Comm'r, 313 U.S. 28,
30 (941) (income from cancellation of lease represented substitute for lost future rents), with Metro.
Bldg. v. Comm'r, 282 F.2d 592, 594 (9th Cir. 196o) (income from sale of lease represented sale of
entire property). It is indeed one of the basic ideas behind the assignment of income doctrine. Comm'r
v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 115 (940) ("The holder of a coupon bond is the owner of two independent and
separable kinds of right. One is the right to demand and receive at maturity the principal amount of
the bond representing capital investment. The other is the right to demand and receive interim
payments of interest on the investment in the amounts and on the dates specified by the coupons.").
124. Horst, 311 U.S. at 114. Again, this Article deals only with individual cash-method taxpayers.
125. Id. at 120.
I26. Id. at I8.
127. Id. at 117 ("The enjoyment of the economic benefit accruing to him by virtue of his
acquisition of the coupons is realized as completely as it would have been if he had collected the
interest in dollars and expended them for any of the purposes named.")
128. Friedman v. Comm'r, 41 T.C. 428, 436 (1963) ("A cash basis taxpayer is not taxable on
income until he receives it actually or constructively. The making of a gift of his right to receive
income does not cause such income to be received until the donor derives the economic benefit of
having the income received by his donee."), aftd, 346 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. I965).
i29. Treas. Reg. § i.iool-i(a) (as amended in 2007).
130. Or, as Professor Kornhauser puts it, "some transaction, usually a market transaction, must
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of a pure stock dividend is not an appropriate realization event because
the appreciation thus represented "still remains the property of the
company and subject to the business risks which may result in wiping out
the entire investment.'' Mrs. Macomber had no change in her economic
position but, more importantly, she had no change in her legal
relationship with the corporation or the other shareholders.'32 This focus
on legal relations sometimes leads courts to find a realization event even
in the absence of a change in economic position.'33
Consider again our taxpayers Lilly and Kunal. Kunal wants a will.
Instead of paying Lilly with cash, he pays her by transferring two shares
of Google stock with a fair market value of $9oo that he had purchased
for $ioo each. This swap is again a realization event for Lilly because she
has acquired property worth $9oo in exchange for her services. It is not
simply transforming her wealth from one form to another because it is
labor that creates wealth. Here, Lilly's labor as an attorney results in her
accession to wealth in the amount of $9oo, clearly realized by the event
of the stock transfer. It is just like Kunal paid her $9oo cash and she used
the money to buy the two shares of Google stock. Thus, although she has
to report the $9oo as gross income, she also gets a basis of $9oo in the
stock, which will determine the amount of her gain or loss on a later
disposition of the stock.
The swap of property for services is also a realization event for
Kunal. While he has spent $9oo of his wealth for the will, part of that
$9oo represents a previously untaxed increase in wealth. It was untaxed
because he had not changed his legal relationship to the stock and thus
there was no readily trackable event, except the passage of time, to mark
his accession to that wealth. There was no event that locked in his gain
until the swap. Thus, because he simply held the stock and did not
engage in any financial transaction with it, he was not required to include
the $700 of appreciation as gross income at any time previously. Now,
however, by transferring the stock to Lilly in exchange for a will he has
engaged in a transaction which changed both his legal and economic
occur which changes the taxpayer's relationship to the asset." Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Story of
Macomber: The Continuing Legacy of Realization, in TAX STORIES 55 (Paul Caron ed. 2003).
131. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955); see also MARVIN CHIRELSTEIN,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 8o (Ioth ed. 2005) (suggesting why, "stripped of its Constitutional
element" the Macomber majority "had the better of the debate" over whether a true stock dividend
should be treated as a realization of income).
132. Professor Chirelstein compares that result with the cases holding that a bond dividend is a
realization event. CHIRELSTIEN, supra note 131. He notes how the legal position of a bondholder is
significantly different than that of a shareholder. Id. at 82-84 (citing to Bazley v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 737
(1941)).
133. In Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court decided that a change in legal
relations was sufficient to trigger realization for § Iool purposes even though, like Mrs. Macomber, the
taxpayer was still subject to the same business risks after the mortgage portfolio swap than before. 499
U.S. 554, 565 (I991).
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position in the Google stock.'34 The § iooi formula ensures that he does
not have to report more than the appreciation as income because his cost
basis in the stock was $200. So his reportable gross income is $700.
The connection between the realization requirement and the
operational limits to § 6i arises from the fact that a legal change in
relations may not reflect true economic change (or vice versa).'35 On the
one hand, Congress sometimes responds to this disparity between legal
form and economic substance by allowing gain to go untaxed even
though an administratively trackable event has occurred whereby the
taxpayer has locked in an objectively measurable gain in wealth. For
example, Congress responded to Bruun by enacting §§ io9 and IoI9:
even though the lease termination was a change in legal relations that
resulted in the taxpayer's undeniable economic gain, it did not meet the
need for a rule that allowed income to be reliably measured, reported,
and paid. The operational concern was cash flow. So Congress created a
cash-out rule. Similarly, Congress created a cash-out rule for certain
investment transactions in § 1031 by providing that a straight swap of
like-kind property would not result in reportable gross income. The
complex rules under § 1031 attempt both to ameliorate the perceived
harshness of a premature realization and to align taxpayers who use
different legal means to achieve the same economic ends. To the extent
taxpayers attempt to cash out of investments, § 1031 and its regulations
require the cashed out value be reported as gross income.
On the other hand, Congress sometimes extends the reach of § 6i to
grab appreciation in property even where there is no closed transaction
to mark the taxpayer's undeniable accession to wealth over which it has
complete dominion. For example, the § 1256 mark-to-market rule for
certain commodity futures contracts makes the mere passage of time the
"event" marking the accession of wealth, even though the taxpayer has
neither "locked in" nor "cashed out" the gain represented by the
appreciated property.' 36 While the legislative history suggests an analogy
to constructive receipt, the better analysis is that § 1256 imposes
constructive realization because taxpayers were using these types of
financial instruments to manipulate timing of losses and gains.'37 In the
134- See Int'l Freighting Corp. v. Comm'r, I35 F.2d 310, 313 (2d Cir. 1943).
135. See Cottage Savings Ass'n, 499 U.S. at 566.
I36. The idea of accrual is found in popular culture as well as tax and accounting theory. See Re
COODER, The Taxes on the Farmer Feed Us All, on Iro THE PURPLE VALLEY (Reprise Records 197)
("We worked through Spring and Winter, through Summer and through Fall / But the mortgage
worked the hardest, and the steadiest of us all. / It worked on nights and Sundays, it worked each
holiday. / It settled down among us and it never went away.").
137. Murphy v. United States, 992 F.2d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the issue is one of
constructive receipt). See generally David F. Levy, Towards Equal Tax Treatment of Economically
Equivalent Financial Instruments: Proposals for Taxing Prepaid Forward Contracts, Equity Swaps, and
Certain Contingent Debt Instruments, 3 FLA. TAX. REV. 471 (997) (explaining ability of taxpayers to
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world of financial instruments, there is little concern about annual
valuation or liquidity.
In these ways, Congress reacts by aligning the realization
requirement with economic substance to address operational problems
that result from either premature or belated realizations. 18 So it is not
quite accurate to say that unrealized increases in economic wealth are
not gross income. A more accurate statement might be that increases in
wealth which either the IRS, the courts, or Congress have deemed to be
unrealized are excluded from the reach of § 6I, while increases in wealth
which have been deemed to be realized are included. In both cases, the
legal definition of "realization" can be seen as a tax administration
concept as much as a substantive tax concept: it is a search for
administrable definition that can be applied in a uniform and coherent
manner and allows income to be reliably measured, reported and paid.
3. Imputed Income
The lack of either ascertainable fair market value or a sufficient
realization event are not the only operational limits on the reach of § 6i.
Taxpayers daily realize "a flow of satisfactions from . . . goods and
services arising out of the personal exertions of the taxpayer on his own
behalf."'3 9 This economic income may have both readily ascertainable
value and may be fully realized by the taxpayer. And the tax system
won't touch it. There are two types of this kind of income, known as
imputed income. First, taxpayers commonly realize economic value from
self-benefiting activities, done either alone or in groups. Second,
taxpayers commonly realize economic value from using self-owned
property. I shall discuss each in turn.
a. Imputed Income from Services
Income imputed to self-benefiting services is not included in the
legal definition of "gross income," even where there is a measurable
market value to the services and the taxpayer clearly realizes the benefit.
For example, the value of shaving, cleaning house, or fixing a meal can
be measured by what one pays for such services. People routinely decide
to cut their child's hair, paint their own homes, change the oil in their car,
and do any number of other activities themselves, rather than pay
manipulate gains and losses through various financial instruments). Reliance on the constructive
receipt doctrine is well critiqued by Henry Ordower in Revisiting Realization: Accretion Taxation, The
Constitution, Macomber, and Mark to Market, 13 VA. TAX REV. 1, 74 (1993) (concluding "[m]arking to
market measures and requires the taxpayer to include in income the gain or loss a taxpayer would
realize if the taxpayer sold or exchanged the underlying property. We might characterize marking to
market better as the doctrine of constructive sale or constructive realization."(emphasis added)).
138. Other times, particularly in statutes that exempt certain gains from income, such as the
exemption for home sale gain in § 121, Congress permanently excludes gain from income for
substantive tax policy reasons.
139. Donald B. Marsh, The Taxation of Imputed Income, 58 POL. Sc Q. 514,514 (1943).
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someone else for the service. Yet there is no attempt to categorize the
resulting increase in wealth from these self-benefiting activities as gross
income. While theorists worry that taxing imputed service income would
incline taxpayers to "idleness" (why work in your garden if it increases
your taxes?), the true reason is operational.'40
Tax administrators would go nuts trying to enforce a regime that
attempted to measure the economic utility experienced by every
individual. This is so for two reasons. First, because the economic gain is
created outside a market, there is difficulty in pegging it to the correct
market. "The special feature of imputed income is that it arises outside
the normal process of the market."''4 ' While it is easy to say "money
saved is money earned" it is harder to determine "how much" money is
saved. The answer depends on what analogous market transaction one
chooses as a surrogate. The myriad markets imaginable for most
activities make accurate assessment a mess. Audits would be exercises in
futility ("We have adjusted the value of your self-prepared evening meal
on August 6th, Ms. Ray, because we conclude it was much more than the
cost of a meal at Burger King").
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the sheer volume of small
dollar transactions would create an administrative nightmare for
taxpayers and the IRS alike. With a current audit rate of less than one
return in IO9, the difficulty in policing accurate reporting would make
suckers out of honest taxpayers.'42 For example, if I am a tax lawyer, I
have an excellent idea of the fair market value of my tax preparation
services. But my preparation of my own tax return does not result in
income to me.'43 Bargain purchases are another example. Taxpayers are
generally not required to report as gross income the difference between
the purchase price of a piece of property and its fair market value.'" If
the tax system were to attempt to corral this type of imputed income, it
14o. Id. at 520.
141. Mark A. Haskell & Joel Kauffman, Taxation of Imputed Income: The Bargain-Purchase
Problem, 17 NAT'L TAX J. 232, 233 (1964) (citing Marsh, supra note 139, at 514 (quotations omitted)).
'42. Allen Kenny, IRS Disputes Study Claiming Millionaires Get Minimal Audit Scrutiny, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Mar. 29, 2006, at 2, available at LEXIS, 2006 TNT 60-3 ("Overall, of the 131 million
individual returns filed in 2005, 1.2 million were examined, equating to an audit rate of just over 0.9
percent, a 2o percent increase over the prior year.").
143. Benjamin v. Hoey, 139 F.2d 945, 946 (2d Cir. i944) ("[W]hat one pays to one's self cannot be
part of one's income.").
144- See Haskell & Kauffman, supra note 141, at 235-39 (collecting cases). If the relationship
between the buyer and seller suggests that the "bargain" component of the purchase is really
something other than self-provided benefit -disguised compensation for example-the imputed
income is taxed. Id. at 236. Thus a real estate agent cannot buy one of her listings for the sales price
less her commission. Id. Similarly, Congress has acted to tax imputed income from "bargain" loans
(loans issued with no interest, for example) where the relationship between the parties suggests that
the foregone interest represents a disguised transfer, that it is not truly self-provided benefit. I.R.C.
§ 7872 (zooo).
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"would subject every purchase to [IRS] scrutiny in order to determine
whether or not a bargain had taken place.' 45 Such intrusion by the IRS
would be intolerable. For these two reasons, then, asking taxpayers to
track, report, and value all "self-purchased" activities that have some
analogous fair market value would be laughably unadministrable.
Two concrete examples show the nature of the imputed income limit
to "gross income." The first occurred in the 1950s in connection with the
dependency deduction. The second exists even today in informal
carpooling and babysitting arrangements. I will discuss each in turn.
For a brief time in the 1950S the IRS tried to measure the imputed
economic value of services such as cooking and cleaning. The resulting
administrative nightmare forced the IRS to abandon the effort. While
the issue arose in the context of deduction and not income, the story of
this misadventure illustrates the perils of divorcing discussion of the tax
base from discussion of tax administration.
The current dependency deduction first appeared in the 1944
Individual Income Tax Act, part of that series of statutes during World
War II by which Congress changed the "class tax" on upper income
taxpayers to a "mass tax" on middle income taxpayers. 46 Recognizing
that the new income provisions would now apply to masses of people, the
tax writers made simplification a chief goal of their legislative efforts. 147
As part of this effort, Congress expanded and simplified the deduction
for "dependents." Previously, a "dependent" was classified as someone
who was incapable of any self-support. Congress eased that requirement
by allowing a taxpayer who provided over half of a person's support to
claim that person as a dependent.' 4t
Computing the new support requirement was tricky. Until 1957, the
IRS followed an "actual expense" rule to decide whether a taxpayer had
145. Haskell & Kauffman, supra note 141, at 235-36.
146. Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-315, 58 Stat. 231; see also Carolyn C.
Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion of the Income Tax During
World War 11, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685, 686 (1988) (stating that the number of taxpayers rose from 7
million to 42 million). The WWII legislation dramatically increased coverage. Id.; see also Alan L.
Feld, Fairness in Rate Cuts in the Individual Income Tax, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 429, 433-34 (1983)
("When the number of households covered by returns is considered, the coverage of the tax system
was extended from about 5% to 74% of the population.").
147. H. R. REP. No. 78-1365, at 1 (I944) (Report of the House Ways and Means Committee on the
Individual Income Tax Bill of 1944). The Report lists five objectives, all of which involve some form of
simplification. Id. at 1-2. For example, Congress created the standard deduction, in large part, to
simplify returns for most taxpayers. Id. at 4; see Feld, supra note 146, at 439.
148. H. R. REP. No. 78-1365, at 5 ("Instead, there will be substituted the concept that a dependent
is anyone for whom the taxpayer furnished over half the support... The present law requirement that
a dependent over t8 must be incapable of self-support is unnecessarily limited and confusing."). With
some modifications, that requirement is still in the current definition in I.R.C. § 152(c)(i)(D) (for
"qualifying child") and I.R.C. § I52(d)(I)(D) (for "qualifying relative").
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provided more than half of a dependent's support.'9 On April 26, 1957,
the IRS issued a new regulation to conform to a 1955 Tax Court decision
holding that a married couple could count the fair market rental value of
lodging in their home as support and so could claim the wife's mother
(who lived with them) as a dependent.'50 The new regulation not only
counted the fair market value of lodging towards the support
requirement, but also counted the fair market value of "services or other
benefits."''5' On August 22, 1958, however, the IRS amended the
regulation to delete the "services or other benefits" language.152 The IRS
explained: "The Regulations providing for the valuation of services
proved extremely difficult to administer. It was virtually impossible to
arrive at a proper value for support furnished in the form of
services ....
Despite the change in the regulations, taxpayers continued to argue
that the value of their services should count in computing support for a
claimed dependent. They lost. In Bartsch v. Commissioner, the Tax
Court rejected the taxpayer's attempt to include the value of services
(such as cooking and cleaning) she provided to her mother.'54 The court
held that valuation of personal services was incredibly impractical:
[1]t is beyond our comprehension why or how such services must be
measured in the market place, or anywhere. How can a quantum
meruit be put upon a daughter's care for an aged mother? Do we
balance our judgment of such 'value' against the 'value' of the personal
satisfaction which the daughter in this case receives in giving such
care? ...We say no. The term 'support' in the Code must mean
something more than furnishing the ordinary kindnesses and
helpfulness and the cooking and the cleaning and the dishwashing that
one able member of a household furnishes another less able. These
things are not to be valued in the market for tax purposes. '
Other courts agreed and approved the IRS rule counting only actual
dollars spent plus the fair market value of property provided towards the
support requirement.': Even though the courts recognized that the IRS
rule favored wealthier taxpayers who could afford to pay for services that
poorer taxpayers self-provided, they found that the "administrative
149. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 53-235, 1953-2 C.B. 23. The IRS would count only the actual dollars spent
to determine support and would not count the market value of property provided to the dependent.
Id. at 23.
I5o. Blarek v. Comm'r, 23 T.C. 1037, 1039 (1955).
151. T.D. 6231, 1957-I C.B. 77.
152. T.D. 6302, 1958-2 C.B. 53.
153. Markarian v. Comm'r, 352 F.2d 870, 873 n-3 (7th Cir. 1965) (reporting statement of the IRS
before the Tax Court).
154. Bartsch v. Comm'r, 41 T.C. 883,886-87 (1964).
155. Id.
156. Markarian, 352 F.2d at 873, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 988 (1966).
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exigencies tip the scales" in favor of the IRS rule.'57
What is striking about this brief historical episode in tax doctrinal
history is that while some of the activities were "priceless" in that there
was no relevant market, both the IRS and courts recognized that even if
the market value of rights exercised in consumption was ascertainable,
the attempt to convert such activity into reportable transactions would
stumble over the second insurmountable administrative problem I
outlined above: intrusive oversight. The rejected regulations required the
IRS to scrutinize myriad small transactions and determine value that was
significantly subjective, not because of a lack of a market, but because
there were too many potentially relevant markets. And that was for a
rule trying to reduce tax, not impose it!
The second concrete example of the imputed income exception to
''gross income" is found in the everyday swaps of self-service activities of
taxpayers in carpooling and babysitting. As discussed above, tax law has
long taxed bartering of services. Revenue Ruling 79-24 is the
foundational ruling, where the IRS ruled that a lawyer and a
housepainter who traded services each had to include the fair market
value of those services into their respective gross incomes.' Ss However,
the IRS has refused to extend the Revenue Ruling to bartering
arrangements involving "the informal exchange of similar services on a
noncommercial basis" where there is no "creation of contractual rights
and obligations among members."'59
Under the IRS ruling, if a group of co-workers decide to carpool
together, they do not have to report the value of the transportation
services they receive from each other as income, even though each
member of the carpool has received economic wealth from the swap.
Similarly, a group of families who swap child-care services are not taxed
on the economic wealth they thereby create for each other in the same-
service trade. The basis for the IRS position is not that these activities
just "save money" and so are not income. There are plenty of other
situations where what looks like "saving money" to the taxpayer looks
like "income" to the law. For example, performing house-sitting services
in exchange for free rent is also just "saving money," yet the value of the
unpaid rent is unquestionably gross income.
I submit that the basis for the IRS excluding the income generated
by informal same-service swaps stems from the same administrative
157. Id.
158. Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-I C.B. 6o.
159. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-08-009 (Nov. 9, 1995).
I6o. See I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory (May 13, 1996), 1996 WL 3332o879 (concluding that taxpayers
who were recruited to occupy and maintain high-priced homes that were being listed for sale, in order
to enhance the marketability of the home, had to include the fair rental value of the home in gross
income).
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concerns that stay the hand of government for other forms of imputed
income: valuation and administrative intrusiveness. Take child care, for
example. The tax law does not tax as gross income the self-benefiting
child-care services of a stay-at-home parent, for the reasons I covered in
looking at dependency deduction history above. The swap by stay-at-
home parents of child care services is really no different-it is also self-
benefiting activity. Each parent has the ability to provide the same
service and, as to same-service swaps, informal swapping of those same
services is simply enhanced self-created benefit. It is therefore excluded
as imputed income for the same two reasons why the simple self-
provided service of child-care is excluded: valuation and administrative
intrusiveness. 
6
'
b. Income Imputed from Property
The strongest case for including imputed income as part of gross
income has historically been made for the value of an owner's use of
tangible property, such as owner-occupied housing or consumer
durables.'"2 While at one time the Supreme Court suggested that
Congress could not constitutionally tax income imputed from property,
that was in reliance on Macomber formalism.' The Supreme Court has
since abandoned Macomber and repeatedly said that Congress has meant
for § 6i to reach as far as constitutionally permissible. Taking that
statement seriously means that the legal definition of income in § 6i
should reach imputed income from ownership of homes and consumer
durables. This is because there is no economic difference between the
taxpayer who buys a condo for $ioo,ooo cash and one who invests that
$ioo,ooo and uses the return on investment to rent the same condo in the
same building. Since § 6i reaches the latter taxpayer's return on
161. One might usefully view the exclusion of imputed service income as resulting from the
government's reluctance to penetrate certain closed economic systems. The self-benefitting activity of
an individual can be viewed as a closed economic system of one. For carpools and babysitting clubs,
the closed systems have multiple participants, but they still do not produce wealth beyond the swap of
like-kind services that stay within the system. That fact, plus the intrusion into daily life required to
extend taxation into the closed system activity, form again the twin operational barriers of valuation
and intrustion. I am indebted to Christopher Bruner for the closed economic system description.
162. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 531, at 26-28 (ioth ed. 2005) (describing the case for taxing
imputed income from property); see also Marsh, supra note 139, at 535-36.
163. The case was He!vering v. Independent Life Inurance Co., 292 U.S. 371, 377 (934), where the
taxpayer owned a building, occupying a portion and renting out a portion. The applicable statute
required the taxpayer to reduce its deduction for building operations by the amount of income
imputed to its use of the building. Id. The Court read the statute at issue as requiring inclusion of
imputed income, but only for the purpose of determining the correct deduction allowed by the statute.
Id. at 379. In so doing, the Court remarked that "[i]f the statute lays taxes on the part of the building
occupied by the owner or upon the rental value of that space, it cannot be sustained, for that would be
to lay a direct tax requiring apportionment." Id. at 378. The Court's actual holding thus allowed the
inclusion of imputed income as an accounting device, adopting the rationale of the dissenting circuit
court judge. See Comm'r v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 67 F.2d 470, 474 (6th Cir. 1933) (Tuttle, J., dissenting).
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investment (and gives no deduction for the rent), it should reach the
former taxpayer's "return on investment" in the home: the economic
income imputed from ownership is neither priceless nor unrealized.' 64
Nonetheless, the law excludes it, because otherwise the operational
problems in determining what income to impute from property
ownership would render enforcement of the law so uneven as to be
arbitrary and would so make suckers out of honest taxpayers. First, to be
administrable, there would have to be a uniform method of measuring
the utility of property ownership. Since there is no actual market
transaction, one must use analogy to create an imputed value. But
imputing income from the use of self-owned property ends with the same
administrative problem as does imputing income from services because
the long-term assets like homes have aspects of both consumption and
investment. For example, a homeowner who is handy purchases a fixer-
upper. The self-benefiting activities of painting and plumbing and the
like are not only self-consumed services, but also might add value to the
lived-in property, over and above any unrealized appreciation in the
marketplace. Or they might not. Any competent real estate agent will tell
you how personal realty is and how homeowners typically overvalue
their homes, in part, because of their emotional attachment (which
economists might lump with other consumption aspects in a "utility"
box). Part of the joy of owning a home is being able to build the fireplace
in the bedroom, take out all the closets, or pour concrete all over the
front yard (a favorite West Texas landscaping technique). Putting a lime
green Jacuzzi in the kitchen probably represents more consumption than
investment.
Second, the same administrative reasons that counsel against taxing
unrealized appreciation counsel against taxing the imputed income from
self-owned property. Just as the fair market value of property fluctuates
over time, as does the market against which it competes as an
"investment," so would the imputed value of its ownership. The
administrative basis for excluding imputed income from the legal
definition in § 6I is explained each year in the Joint Committee on
Taxation's report on Tax Expenditures:
The individual income tax does not include in gross income the
imputed income that individuals receive from ... owner-occupied
homes and durable goods. However, the Joint Committee staff does
not classify this exclusion as a tax expenditure. The measurement of
imputed income for tax purposes presents administrative problems and
its exclusion from taxable income may be regarded as an
164. In fact, the Civil War income tax provisions did allow a deduction for residential rental
payments. The first Commissioner of Internal Revenue objected that this arrangement led to evasion
and he recommended instead that the symmetry be maintained by taxing owners on their imputed
income and not allowing renters a deduction. SELIGMAN, supra note 35, at 439.
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administrative necessity. '65
4. Summary
This review of the three operational limits to the reach of § 6I's
definition of "gross income" illustrates why the legal meaning of income
cannot be conterminous with the economic meaning of income. Either
Congress, the courts, or the IRS may conclude that a taxpayer who has
acceded to wealth in an economic sense has not acceded to wealth within
the legal sense of § 61. Ted Castronova's finding that virtual worlds
generate significant economic activity raises a big red flag to taxing
authorities, who are bullish on finding new sources of revenue for the
government.'6 But one must apply the legal concept of income-not the
economic concept-to see whether and to what extent online activity
within virtual worlds generates gross income reachable by § 61. The
function of the legal definition of income is not only to produce revenue
to the government but also to limit government overreach and thereby
preserve the proper balance necessary to fairly administer the tax laws
and maintain the discipline of voluntary compliance.
III. APPLICATION OF TAX PRINCIPLES TO VIRTUAL WORLDS
To understand why in-world transactions are not and should not be
taxable it is important to first examine the alternate approach: a "cash
out" rule epitomized by RMT. Subsection A explains why RMT is
taxable. Subsection B then applies basic tax principles to activity within
World of Warcraft and Second Life to explain why there is a substantial
argument for taxation of in-world transactions in both games. The
subsection considers and rejects taxpayer arguments that taxpayers do
not realize ascertainable gains in wealth as a result of in-world
transactions. Subsection C then advances my thesis that the concept of
imputed income provides the appropriate protections for taxpayers in all
virtual worlds and, more importantly, tells us at what point in-world
transactions ought to become taxable.
As a preliminary matter, I should note that I take a robustly external
view of virtual worlds. 6 ' They are, at least at the present time and for
present analytical purposes, two-dimensional representations controlled
by computer code. A virtual sword is not an object; it is object coding. 68
And, unlike some scholars, I do not regard the object code for a virtual
165. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES
FOR FISCAL YEARS 2OO6-2010, at 5 (Joint Comm. Print 2006).
i66. Castranova, supra note 13, at 34-36.
167. Cf. Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 357 (2003)
(defining "external perspective").
168. Yochai Benkler, There is No Spoon, in THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW, GAMES, AND VIRTUAL
WORLDS i8o, 180-89 (Jack M. Blakin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., 2oo6).
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sword as "existing" in any sense outside the context of the game.' 6, It is
not a series of zeros and ones that stands alone; it is a series of zeros and
ones that forms a relation with other zeros and ones to create the illusion
of a virtual sword in a specific virtual space. As Richard Bartle, one of the
preeminent designers of virtual worlds, explains:
All virtual objects are defined by the virtual world's code. That is notjust one piece of code, but the sum of the code, along with all the data
it operates on: everything is so dependent on everything else that it is
impossible to isolate a single few lines of program and say "these are
the Spear of Destiny" or "these are the Sword of Truth." Those same
lines that "define" the Spear of Destiny also partly define the Sword of
Truth-if the spear did not exist, the sword's influence on the virtual
world would be ever so slightly different. The code is the DNA of the
virtual world .... 7 o
Thus, for my purposes, I analogize to virtual worlds, not to the real
world, although they are filled with landscapes and one moves around in
them (more or less) the way one moves in the real world. They are more
like a collective work of art -a living painting, a communal symphony, or
a continuously improvised play. I will return to this last analogy when
explaining why the concept of imputed income means that in-world
transactions in both WoW and SL are not and should not be reached by
§ 61. But we must first look at the cash-out rule and then consider the
application of the priceless and realization exceptions to in-world
activity.
A. TAXING RMT (THE CASH OUT RULE)
When a WoW or SL player receives US$ for "selling" either a player
account or an in-world item on an auction site, the sale produces gross
income, regardless of who wins the current legal battles over who has
what property rights in virtual items used in-world.'' If the player has no
property rights, the sale is the sale of services. In exchange for US$, one
party agrees to help another party advance in the game by meeting in-
world and transferring a game object that will enhance game play.
Similarly a player might pay another to "level up" a character. Both
transactions are for services; they are no different than a bridge player
paying a "ringer" to play in a tournament. If the non-tax law concludes
that a virtual item is "property," then that item's sale is subject to the
formula in § iooi. The contract for sale will be similar to any other
169. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1053-56 (2005).
170. Richard A. Bartle, Virtual Worldliness: What the Imaginary Asks of the Real, 49 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 19,35-36 (2004).
171. As I discuss below in Part III(B)(2)(a), legal scholars have engaged in a robust debate over
the extent to which property rules govern the relations between the owners of online gaming sites and
the owners of online gaming accounts (i.e. players) as to virtual items created or used by players in the
game.
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contract for sale of an item of property, such as a house. The deal will
"close" when the property is transferred in-world. To avoid the entire
amount realized being included in gross income, the seller will need to
establish a basis in the item transferred. Either way, however, the
transaction produces gross income within the meaning of § 6i.
Many players of the more structured games dislike RMT, as do the
game developers. To combat RMT, the WoW gaming software now
simply does not permit in-world transfers of many valuable items of loot
between players. The game owners have changed the architecture of the
game to prevent transfers, which makes it impossible to "close" an RMT
for certain items.'72 In WoW parlance, the item is "soulbound" to the
avatar. While that makes the item unavailable for an RMT, it also
reduces the item's utility, since it cannot be traded for in-world goods or
services and trade is an essential component of gameplay. However, it
can still be sold to an NPC merchant and reduced to gold, the WoW unit
of exchange. And RMT of gold is robust. Similarly, WoW players can
still sell their characters, which involves selling the player account by
selling the password and allowing the new owner of the account to
change the owner profile.
Games similar to WoW have approached the RMT issue differently.
Sony has created an in-world auction site that allows RMT for its game
"Everquest II." Players can either trade or buy items from each other
(and from Sony) by using their choice of in-world currency (called
"Platinum") or US$. To the extent that § 6i applies to RMT, it makes no
difference whether the auction site is run by the game owner or a third
party. When US$ are received in exchange for an in-world item or a
promise to transfer an in-world item, the transaction is about as clear a
realized accession to wealth as one can imagine. It is a plain vanilla
taxable transaction."'
WoW players might object and argue that RMT should not be
taxable because the activity is not permitted by the End User License
Agreement (EULA). SL players do not have that argument because
RMT is permitted, even encouraged, by their TOS. The argument had
some traction under the Supreme Court's reasoning in Commissioner v.
Wilcox where the Court held that an embezzler did not have to report
172. James Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by Software, 114 Yale L.J. 1719, 1751-52 (2005).
173. Similarly, when real world services are provided in exchange for a virtual item, it is a cash out
transaction. For example, the following offer posted on craigslist on April 8, 2007, would constitute a
taxable RMT transaction: "Hello I need 5000 world of gold for my epic flying mount. In return you
can mount me." Best of Craigslist: An EPIC Mount!, http://www.craigslist.org/about/best/nyc/
3o8349637.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2007). An "epic flying mount" is a rare item in Wow that is
useable only by high level players. Apparently, the offer was accepted and the transaction closed the
next day. See Posting of auxilary to http://forums.clubsi.com/ubbthreads.php/ubb/showflatlNumber/
124568o/page/I/fpartli (Apr. i1, 2007, 12:3o EST).
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embezzled income because he was under a legal duty to return the stolen
funds.'74 But the Court overruled Wilcox in James v. United States.'75
Since then, the reach of § 61 does not depend on whether a realized
accession to wealth is moral, immoral, legal, or illegal.
[T]he federal income tax is a tax on net income, not a sanction against
wrongdoing. That principle has been firmly imbedded in the tax statute
from the beginning. One familiar facet of the principle is the truism
that the statute does not concern itself with the lawfulness of the
income that it taxes. 76
Both WoW and SL players might claim (the latter with less
credulity) that they do not "intend" to make money, or that their RMT
results not in income but just in less costly game play. The reach of § 6I
does not depend on intent. It depends on whether the taxpayer has a
clearly realized accession to wealth, regardless of its form as cash,
property, or services. A taxpayer who picks up a penny on the street does
not "intend" it to be a rare 1922 double dime, worth $5,000. But if that
turns out to be the case, $5,000 is the reportable income nonetheless. 7
Nor does § 61 depend on what expenses were incurred to produce the
income. That is a matter of determining the proper deduction from gross
income to arrive, ultimately, at taxable income. It is not an argument
against inclusion in the first place, as many gamblers learn to their
dismay.'7
B. TAXING IN-WORLD TRANSACTIONS
The gimlet eye of the tax collector looks at World of Warcraft and
sees taxpayers playing for prizes and awards. 79 He looks at trades in
Second Life and sees barter clubs. I will first set up a typical example of
an in-world transaction in WoW and then one in SL before assessing the
accuracy of the tax collector's vision.
Assume a WoW player-call him Leeroy-is a Level 70 Paladin and
174. 327 U.S. 404,409 (946).
175. 366 U.S. 213,222 (i96i).
176. Comm'r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691 (1966) (allowing a securities dealer convicted of crimes
relating to his business to deduct the expenses of the criminal defense).
177. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14 (as amended in 1993).
178. See, e.g., Mack v. Comm'r, 429 F.2d 182, 184 (6th Cir. 197o). See generally Scott R. Fouch,
Recreational Gamblers: Gambling Once Too Often?, TAX NOTEs TODAY, Dec. 7, 2004, available at
LEXIS, 2004 TNT 235-43.
179. Prizes are gross income under § 61 courtesy of the specific language in § 74 which provides
that the term "gross income" includes "amounts received as prizes." Its regulations clarify that
"prizes" can be in the form of cash, property, or services. Treas. Reg. § 1.74-1 (as amended in 1986). If
the prize is property or services, the income to be reported is the fair market value of the property or
services. So if a player on Jeopardy wins $25,000, the player must report that amount as gross income.
If a player on The Price Is Right wins a car that regularly sells for $25,ooo, then that is the amount the
player must report as gross income. Whitten v. Comm'r, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) IO64 (1995) (finding the
taxpayer's prize of i99i Chevy Geo Tracker on Wheel of Fortune resulted in gross income of $19,830.)
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completes a quest with his Guild. As loot he picks up (a) the rare and
powerful Gladiator Slicer Sword (which compares favorably to the
fabled "Sword of a Thousand Truths"), and (b) the very useful Beast
Lord Helm.'" Assume the Gladiator Sword trades for G$I5o and the
Beast Lord Helm trades for G$Ioo.'s' Once he "picks up" those items,
WoW credits his account with them and he is free to use them. Assume
further that Leeroy can sell some of his old equipment now that he has
acquired these fine items. So he sells the lower rated Bloodforged Shield
for G$6 and his old Arbiter's Blade for G$19. '2 Assume that on Leeroy's
server (Argent Dawn) G$ trades at US$20 for G$ioo (in other words,
each G$ is worth twenty cents). By successfully completing the quest,
Leeroy has increased his wealth by a total of G$25o, or US$50, the value
of the items he has acquired. Additionally, he has increased his wealth by
G$25, the amount he received in trade for the two items he sold, or
US$5.' 3 Whether these prizes are received for besting other players
under the rules of engagement in Jeopardy or for besting WoW NPCs
under its considerably more complex rules of engagement is of no
consequence to the Tax Code: if what Leeroy received represents a
clearly realized accession to wealth-either in the form of cash property,
or service, it's income.., unless, of course, it is either explicitly excluded
by another statute or falls within one of the three great exceptions to the
reach of § 61.
Assume a Second Life account owner-call her Zelda-designs and
sells virtual clothing for SL "residents" (they do not like to be called
"players"). In one particular transaction she has designed and created
(through manipulation of "prims") a wedding gown which she sells to
another account owner's avatar in exchange for L$i,5OO. Assume further
that L$ currently trade for L$25o to the US$. After the transaction,
Zelda has increased her wealth by a gross amount of US$6 ... unless, of
course, it is either explicitly excluded by another statute or falls within
one of the three great exceptions to the reach of § 6i.
I8o. The "Sword of a Thousand Truths" appears in South Park: Make Love Not Warcraft
(Comedy Central telvision broadcast Oct. 4, 2006).
181. For information on the Gladiator sword see Allakhazam.com: Gladiator's Slicer,
http://wow.allakhazam.com/item.html?witem=28295 (last visited Oct. 31, 2007). For information about
the Beast Lord Helm see Allakhazam.com: Beast Lord Helm, http://wow.allakhazam.com/item.html?
witem=28275 (last visited Oct. 31 , 2007).
182. For information on the Arbiter's Blade see Allakhazam.com: Arbiter's Blade,
http://wow.allakhazam.com/item.html?witem= 11784 (last visited Oct. 31, 2007). For the Bloodforged
Shield, see Allakhazam.com: Bloodforged Shield, http://wow.allakhazam.com/item.html?witem=14954
(last visited Oct. 31. 2007).
183. Part of the calculation will depend on the game rules. Some games have an item limit and so
to accept the new items into inventory, Leeroy might have to delete two other items. In that case, his
wealth increases only by the difference between the new and old times.
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i. Priceless
Leeroy cannot avail himself of the priceless exception. Leeroy can
convert both items into US$, either directly (on third party auction sites)
or indirectly (by selling in-world for G$ which he can then sell for US$).
Even if there is no player-to-player market, Leeroy can always sell to an
NPC and then cash out the G$. Accordingly, Leeroy has no argument
that his activity is "priceless." Since every item can be converted into
gold and gold can be converted into US$ the calculation is simple. It's
administrable.""4 That is what makes the case for taxation strong. Both
the Gladiator Sword and Beast Lord Helm have a readily ascertainable
fair market value.
Zelda has an even less plausible claim that the receipt of L$I,500 is
"priceless." Not only are L$ actually traded for US$ but those
transactions are supported and encouraged by the game owners. In sharp
distinction to Blizzard, Inc. (the owner of World of Warcraft), Linden
Lab runs an auction site in-world, in which residents can freely trade any
virtual item for either L$ or for US$ and can exchange the virtual
currency for US$. It would not be surprising to eventually see a Thomas
Cook currency exchange next to the H&R Block shop in Second Life. 5
2. Realization
Leeroy has a stronger argument that he has not realized any wealth
from the prize drop. He can approach this issue in two ways. First, he
would argue that he has not actually or constructively received any cash,
property, or services when the Gladiator Sword and Beast Lord Helm
are credited to his account because his ability to convert them to usable
wealth is too remote and contingent on factors beyond his control.
Second, he would argue that the Sword and Helm cannot be severed
from his player account and so, like Mrs. Macomber, all he has is a paper
gain in wealth.
The strength of these realization arguments depends on the nature
of Leeroy's rights in virtual items such as swords and helmets or G$.
Fewer rights give him a stronger tax argument; more property rights
weaken this realization argument. I will first give a short review of the
property rights debate. I will then assess Leeroy's realization argument
assuming more or less robust property rights in virtual items. I will
conclude with a brief analysis of Zelda's realization arguments for
Second Life transaction, but by that time I believe the reader will have
184. Further, since the computer has already tracked the transactions in order to put them into
Leeroy's inventory, it is not a huge technological problem to track trades or changes in inventory over
time. A full discussion of those issues, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. The important point
here is that the items themselves have a readily ascertainable fair market value.
185. See H&R Block Gets a "Second Life," WEBCPA, Mar. 16, 2007, http://www.webcpa.com
article.cfm?articleid=23653&pg=newsarticles.
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little need of much elaboration.
a. The Cyberproperty Debate
Beginning in the early 1990s non-tax legal scholars began publishing
their thoughts on the interplay between various areas of law and human
activity in the virtual world of the Internet.' 86 Scholarship on "cyberlaw"
burgeoned in the late 199os, after the World Wide Web had firmly
established itself as "the" Internet and only those with graying or
diminishing hair remembered the days of BBS (Bulletin Board Systems)
and dial-up, the ways of Prodigy and Compuserve." 7
As more academics focus more attention on the MMORPG
phenomenon, they have addressed both the general question of how law
governs the relationship between players and MMORPG owners, and
the specific question of whether law provides property rights to players
in virtual worlds regardless of the provisions contained in the EULAs.'
In a thoughtful and provocative article, Professor Joshua Fairfield
makes a strong claim for player ownership of virtual items. He argues
that "computer code that is designed to act like real world property
[should] be regulated and protected like real world property.'S By that
he means that:
If I own a building in a virtual world, I own it regardless of the
intellectual property inherent in the underlying code. I own it
regardless of the physical chattel used by another person to experience
it. I own it, control it, can invite people to be in it, hold meetings in it,
work there, invest in it, and sell it to other people who might want to
do the same.'"
Professor Fairfield explains why courts should uphold such rights in
virtual property regardless of any contrary provisions in a EULA, using
the WoW TOS as his prime example.'9' In contrast to Professor Fairfield,
other scholars advocate using property rules to protect game developers
186. See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Tort Liability, the First Amendment, and Equal Access to
Electronic Networks, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65, 66 (1992) (discussing potential application of common
carrier regulation under statute and common law to mediate disputes about access rights of users to
Internet and tort liabilities of Internet providers for information contained in e-mail or electronic
publishing).
187. The first major book was LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (i999).
For a prior comprehensive article, see David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders- The Rise of
Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN L. REV. 1367, 1401 (1996) (arguing for creation of separate body of law to
regulate online interactions).
88. See, e.g., Woodrow Barfield, Intellectual Property Rights in Virtual Environments: Considering
the Rights of Owners, Programmers, and Virtual Avatars, 39 AKRON L. REV. 649 (2OO6); Joseph J.
Beard, Clones, Bones, and Twilight Zones: Protecting the Digital Persona of the Quick, the Dead and
the Imaginary, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. I165, 1271 (2001); Fairfield, supra note 169, at 1047, IO82-84;
Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 3, at 72-73.
189. Fairfield, supra note 169, at 1048.
I9o. Id. at 1o78.
I9i. Id. at IO82-84.
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and those who own the physical hardware that house the software.'92
The academic debate often centers on the role of the EULA. As
Part I explained, Leeroy may play WoW only after agreeing to a
contract, called either an EULA or a TOS. Blizzard, Inc., the owner of
WoW, uses both documents. By their terms, they deny Leeroy any rights
to any virtual item other than game play rights. For example, Leeroy
agrees to waive any protections given him by copyright law to any
content he might create while playing the game. As I read Professor
Fairfield, he would find the WoW EULA to violate public policy and so
not allow the EULA to withstand the protections Leeroy might
otherwise claim under federal copyright law.'93
EULAs arose out of the uncertainty about whether software
developers were adequately protected by copyright law.'94 Rather than
selling their software outright, software developers turned to the legal
device of a license as the mechanism to distribute their work. This often
raised an issue of whether the license was a true license or a disguised
sale. If it was a sale, the first sale doctrine would apply and developers
would lose control over further distribution.'95
The argument for disregarding EULAs rests, in large part, on the
claim that they are sufficiently close to contracts of adhesion that courts
should disregard their terms on public policy grounds.' 96 It is true that
EULAs are sometimes found to be invalid contracts, particularly EULAs
that come physically bundled in the shrinkwrap so that the purchaser
cannot even tell what the terms are before making the purchase.'97 But
192. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2166 (2004)
(framing the question as "[w]hen can the owner of a computer system connected to the Internet assert
a right to 'exclude' unwanted uses of her system?").
193. See Fairfield, supra note 169, at IO83-84 ("These provisions [in the Wow EULA] surpass the
usual abuses of contracts of adhesion.... [P]roperty law provides a rationale and a mechanism for
resisting the systematic expropriation of emergent online property forms by use of contract."). Since
the Second Life Terms of Service grant far more rights to players, I do not consider it here.
194. The first sale doctrine is about control. For example, a book is a copy of a writer's authorship.
Sale of the book is different than sale of the copyright in the book. While 17 U.S.C. § io6 (2000) gives
the copyright owner the exclusive right to distribute copies, 17 U.S.C. § Io9(a) (2ooo) limits that right
to the "first sale" of any given copy of the work. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51
(I9O8). After that, the owner of the copy has the right to dispose of his or her copy of the work. If the
user of software thus purchased only a license right, the user could be prevented from reselling the
copy, at least in theory. Professor Leandra Lederman discusses how this distinction might apply to
virtual world EULAs in Stranger than Fiction: Taxing Virtual Worlds, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract-id=969 9 84 .
195. Compare SoftMan Products Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, IO87, 1094 (C.D.
Cal. 2001) (finding transaction to be sale, not license, and so refusing to grant Adobe a preliminary
injunction to enjoin SoftMan from re-selling unbundled Adobe software programs), with Davidson &
Assocs., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1178 (E.D. Mo. 2oo4) (finding that EULA
used by Blizzard Entertainment, developer of World of Warcraft, for Battle.net was true license).
196. See Fairfield, supra note 169, at IO82-84.
197. Meridian Project Sys., Inc. v. Hardin Constr. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1ioi, iO6-07 (E.D. Cal.
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when such shrinkwrap EULAs give the user the right to return the
software after purchase, then the user's choice to use the software
instead of return constitutes a binding assent and the contract is good.' 9
And a EULA which gives the user the ability to accept or reject the
terms of the license by clicking through the license presented on the
screen to the program beyond is going to be valid for that reason
(adequate disclosure and explicit assent), unless it is a contract of
adhesion. "
The doctrinal details of what constitutes a contract of adhesion vary
from state to state. For example, New Mexico uses this test: (i) the
agreement must occur in the form of a standardized contract with
boilerplate clauses prepared entirely by one party to the transaction; (2)
the party who prepared the contract must be in a superior bargaining
position such that the weaker party has no realistic alternative to doing
business with the stronger party; and (3) the contract must be offered on
a take-it-or-leave-it basis with no opportunity for the weaker party to
even attempt to bargain.2" New York uses a slightly different test:
adhesion is found when the party seeking to enforce the contract (i) uses
high pressure tactics or deceptive language in the contract; (2) there is
inequality of bargaining power between the parties; and (3) where the
contract inflicts substantive unfairness on the weaker party.2"' Common
to all adhesion tests, however, is the idea that the weaker party has no
realistic alternative to agreeing to the contract offered.
The EULAs do not appear to be contracts of adhesion under any
state law test because players have realistic alternatives. Even assuming
that the contract is boilerplate, offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and
inflicts substantial unfairness to the player (in requiring the player to
waive all copyrights, or arbitrate disputes, among other provisions), the
player is not the weaker party; players have plenty of alternative choices.
Players can play other structured games or participate in other virtual
world environments. The market is full of a variety of games and the
short history of virtual worlds shows how the player population on any
given world expands and contracts, sometimes to the point that the
virtual world dies." ' Yes, virtual worlds can die."° Players rarely choose
2005) (discussing copyright law idea/expression dichotomy, in context of deciding whether end user's
copying of software help files infringed copyright, and collecting cases on validity of EULAs as
licenses).
198. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
199. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious About User-Friendly Mass Market Licensing for
Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. REv. 687, 691-92 (2004).
200. Guthmann v. LaVida Llena, 709 P.2d 675, 678 (N.M. 1985).
201. In re Arbitration of Ball, 665 N.Y.S.2d 444,446 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
202. Bruce Sterling Woodcock gives a good history of these population shifts. See
Mmorgchart.com, http://www.mmorgchart.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2007).
203. See Clive Thompson, Not With a Bang, but a Whimper, WIRED, Dec. 15, 2005,
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what games to play-whether structured or unstructured-based on the
contract terms of the EULA; the choice instead turns on how good the
game play is in the virtual world offered to them.2"
In a recent decision, federal district court Judge Robreno held that
Linden Lab's arbitration clause in its TOS was invalid because the TOS
was a contract of adhesion." This is the first court decision addressing
what has, until now, been an academic debate. A review of the court's
opinion, however, discloses some rather peculiar analysis.
Mr. Bragg sued Linden for damages related to a land deal in SL. Mr.
Bragg had taken advantage of a glitch in the operating system to
purchase virtual land at auction for a far lower price than the game
developers intended and then resold at a huge markup.2 6 When Linden
discovered the deals, it exercised its God-like powers to unwind the deal
and then shut down Mr. Bragg's account, in which he had invested a
considerable amount of US$."° Mr. Bragg's claim for damages depends
on whether he had rights in the virtual land independent of the SL
TOS .
Judge Robreno's opinion is on a preliminary procedural point: the
validity of a mandatory arbitration clause in the TOS. That is, the TOS
required Mr. Bragg to arbitrate his claim in San Francisco. Mr. Bragg
instead wanted to sue in Pennsylvania, where he lived. 9 Judge Robreno
decided that that arbitration clause was inoperative because the TOS was
a contact of adhesion.
The district court's adhesion analysis is circular. Consistent with
most state law concepts of adhesion, the analysis turns on whether Mr.
Bragg had "reasonably available market alternatives .... . The court
decided that Mr. Bragg had no reasonable alternatives because "[SL] was
the first and only virtual world to specifically grant its participants
property rights in virtual land. 2  Therefore, Mr. Bragg had no other
gaming choices. This reasoning assumes its conclusion. The entire
http://www.wired.com/gaming/gamingreviews/commentary/games/2005/I 2/69848.
204. This can be seen in any number of blogs on the subject. For example, at the Terra Nova blog
the commentators routinely discuss new games and who is playing what and why. Rarely, if ever, do
any of the commentators note a refusal to play a game based on the EULA or TOS. What is notable
about this silence is that most of the commentators on Terra Nova are highly educated professionals-
lawyers, game developers, academicians -who discuss an impressive array of subjects (including
taxation of virtual worlds) with sophistication and insight. Yet none have been prompted to write
about any refusal to play a game because of the EULA or TOS.
205. Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 6o6-it (E.D. Pa. 2007).
206. Id. at 597.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 595.
209. Id. at 597.
210. Id. at 6o6.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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substantive legal question is whether Mr. Bragg indeed has property
rights in virtual land independent of the TOS. Deciding that the TOS was
a contract of adhesion because Linden did as a matter of law grant
residents "property rights" in virtual land, assumes the answer to the
substantive legal question."3
Worse, the court's adhesion analysis proves too much by reducing
the "relevant market" to a set of one. Logically, the court's analysis
would find that Hertz's form rental contract fails the "reasonable
alternative market" test because Hertz is the only rental car agency that
offers Toyotas, or some other car. Under the court's analysis, every
EULA and TOS fails the reasonable alternative market test because
every game world offers something unique. In other words, the court is
here narrowing the scope of the "relevant" market to a set of one. That
cuts against common sense.
To say that EULAs are valid, however, is not to say that all their
terms will be upheld in a dispute. For example, it is standard contract law
that ambiguities in the EULA will generally be construed against the
game developer since they are boilerplate."4 However, it seems quite
unlikely that federal copyright law will preempt the terms of a valid
EULA, because "the fact that parties bargained privately to achieve
mutual assent" will likely suffice as the needed "extra element" beyond
the federal protections to prevent statutory preemption.2 ' 5
b. Analysis of Realization Argument
The survival of the EULA as a valid contract may have important
implications for the tax analysis. Contracts themselves are a species of
property called a "chose in action." A "chose" is just another word for
thing and "in action" just means the opposite of in possession. A chose in
action is a species of intangible personalty that can be owned and
transferred. Generally it is "[t]he right to bring an action to recover a
213. Because the parties later settled the case, Judge Robreno never got the chance to apply basic
property law doctrine on sale of realty at auction to the events to see whether Linden breached a duty
towards Mr. Bragg.
214. Erez Reuveni, On Virtual Worlds: Copyright and Contract Law at the Dawn of the Virtual
Age, 82 IND. L.J. 261, 290 (2007) ("[J]udicial construction of EULAs tends to follow the same analysis
as other standard form contract cases ...."). Mr. Reuveni's very nice article reviews how various
contract law doctrines, including those in the UCC and the Restatement, and public policy may not
invalidate EULAs but may rather affect specific terms in the EULA. Id. at 297-303.
215. Id. at 292-94. Although beyond the scope of this Article, I note a small apparent inconsistency
in Mr. Reuveni's otherwise excellent article. While his later analysis suggests that federal copyright law
will not preempt EULAs, in an earlier section he suggests that "literary works created within the game
space" would receive copyright protections. Id. at 284. For example, if our Wow player Leeroy wrote
a fight song for his Guild, Mr. Reuveni apparently believes copyright law would extend the usual copy
rights to Leeroy, despite a waiver provision in the Wow EULA. I am not clear on how Mr. Reuveni
reaches this conclusion. He analogizes to the player composing poetry on Word, but the Word TOS
does not ask users to waive copyrights, and Mr. Reuveni provides no other reasoning or authority.
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debt, money, or thing.".... State laws give the specifics. For example,
under Indiana law a chose in action is "a personal right not reduced into
possession but recoverable by suit in law. It is a property right
characterized as personalty. The term in its broadest sense encompasses
all rights of action whether they sound in contract or tort.,
217
For example, my car is my "chose" and I have "possession" of it
when I'm driving it. But if I lease you my car, you get possession during
the lease term and I have a right to get the car back at the end of the
lease term. That contract right is the chose in action. I have traded my
possession of the thing for an action at law for its recovery (or damages
or whatever). I can sell my right to sue you."8 Or a creditor can seize it."9
Or it could become part of my bankruptcy estate if I file bankruptcy.
20
Or if I die, that chose in action becomes part of my taxable estate. 2 '
To the extent that courts uphold EULAs, players still do own
property: their player account. It is a chose in action. As with any other
type of property, a player's account may be more or less valuable. WoW
players routinely sell their accounts for US$, with the price depending on
how many avatars of what power and with what virtual items the account
contains."' Once one views the player account as the relevant property
interest "owned" by the player, then the realization argument provides a
potentially strong argument against taxation.
Consider first WoW. If EULAs are the source of our player
Leeroy's rights, then he has good arguments as to why he has not
realized income within the meaning of § 6i when he picks up the
Gladiator's Slicer and the Beast Lord Helm. First, he would point to the
doctrine of constructive receipt, which provides one test for realization:
"Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer's possession is
216. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 234 (7th ed. 1999); see also Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 622, 630 (1850)
("The term chose in action is one of comprehensive import. It includes the infinite variety of contracts,
covenants, and promises, which confer on one party a right to recover a personal chattel or a sum of
money from another by action.").
217. Neffle v. Neffle, 483 N.E.2d 767,771 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (citations omitted).
218. Augusta Med. Complex v. Blue Cross of Kan., Inc., 634 P.2d I123, 1125 (Kan. i98i) ("Free
assignment of choses in action is considered to be a matter of public policy.").
219. See, e.g., Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. City of Clarksdale, 257 U.S. 1o, 22 (1921) (holding that
Mississippi law had changed common law so as to allow stock certificate [a chose in action] to be
seized and sold in the same manner as chattel).
220. It U.S.C. § 541(a)(i) (2ooo) (providing that property of the bankruptcy estate includes "all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case"); Cable v.
Ivy Tech State Coll., 2oo F.3d 467, 472-73 (7 th Cir. 1999) (stating that § 541's language "includes
choses in action and other legal claims that could be prosecuted for benefit of the estate").
221. Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. i, 12 (1928) (finding that decedent's partnership rights in a
New York partnership were a chose in action and, as such, Connecticut could tax the passage of
decedent's chose in action even though partnership was outside of Connecticut).
222. IGE, The Leading MMORPG Services Company, http://www.ige.com (last visited Oct. 31,
2007).
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constructively received by him in the taxable year during which it is
credited to his account, set apart for him, or otherwise made available so
that he may draw upon it at any time .... ,,23 Recall that income can be in
any form: cash, property, services. So if "property" is credited to
Leeroy's player account, or set aside for him, or otherwise made
available to him so that he may draw upon it at any time, that credit will
constitute income within the meaning of § 6i. Leeroy's argument rests on
the corollary, also expressed in the regulation: "However, income is not
constructively received if the taxpayer's control of its receipt is subject to
substantial limitations or restrictions." '24 Leeroy will argue that because
his use of the virtual items, including use of the G$, is so severely limited
by the EULA, he has not received any prize or award unless he engages
in another transaction that "locks in" the gain, such as cashing out
through RMT. The WoW EULA is a substantial restriction to his
accession to wealth because the EULA specifically forbids Leeroy from
selling his account or the virtual items.
The importance of the EULA here is that it creates a legal
restriction on Leeroy. Courts have held that certain contractual
restrictions may operate to prevent income from being constructively
realized."' While the computer software will prevent Leeroy from
transferring rares like the Chalice to another player in-world, such
practical difficulties are not relevant to the constructive receipt analysis.
The cases interpreting the "substantial restriction" language of the
regulation hold that it refers to substantial legal restrictions, not practical
226
ones.
Although the substantial restriction argument is strong, I doubt it is
ultimately a winner. First, the analogy to a deferred payment provision is
imperfect. The EULA is not a deferred payment contract because
223. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (as amended in 1979). This language would arguably give Leeroy a
peg on which to argue that the interstitial winnings are not income to him until actually cashed out
because it would cost him $1.75 to extract each amount below P$io.oo (per TOS § 2.16). Since,
according to the PLR's analysis, each P$6.oo credited to his account for a win represents a return of his
$2.50 capital and income of $3.50, then, in the scenario posited in the text, he is never winning more
than P$io.oo at one time.
224. Id.
225. See, e.g., Robinson v. Comm'r, 44 T.C. 20, 36 (1965) (upholding boxer Sugar Ray Robinson's
use of "deferred payment" contracts to spread income from a fight into subsequent tax years); Rev.
Rul. 60-31, i96o-i C.B. 164 (implying that deferred payment contracts are valid even if payor was
willing and able to sign a contract calling for immediate payment). Note that a legal restriction against
RMT does not prevent an RMT from being a realization event.
226. See, e.g., Loose v. United States, 74 F.2d 147, i5o (8th Cir. 1934) (holding taxpayer
constructively received income from matured interest coupons even though stroke prevented taxpayer
from traveling from California to New York to retrieve and cash the coupons); Hornung v. Comm'r,
47 T.C. 428,435 (1967) (holding taxpayer's physical inability to retrieve prize car located in New York
when awarded the car on December 31 was not relevant to Court's analysis; instead taxpayer did not
constructively receive the prize because "nothing was given or presented to petitioner to evidence his
ownership or right to possession of the car at that time").
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Leeroy gets the loot immediately. Thus, the restrictions in the EULA are
better viewed as affecting the amount of income Leeroy realizes from the
prize rather than the timing of his realization. Once credited to his
account, Leeroy has full use of the virtual items, at least so far as the
architecture of the game permits. The key to constructive receipt is
whether the taxpayer had "essentially unfettered control over the date of
actual receipt."2"7 Permission to use is what makes the items valuable, not
just permission to sell. Use is almost as big a stick in the bundle of
property rights as is alienability. Even if the use is restricted to the
confines of the game, the coding restrictions just affect value, not
realization.
Second, even deferred payment provisions will be ignored if they are
either (a) sham provisions or (b) honored in the breach rather than in the
execution. WoW virtual items are routinely traded in RMT on third
party sides such as www.IGE.com. Even if Blizzard routinely enforces
the EULA prohibition, the weed-like growth of RMT suggests that the
contractual provisions do not operate as a true restriction on Leeroy's
ability to convert virtual items to US$."9
Leeroy's second argument against realization is that his receipt of
the Sword and the Helm is just like Mrs. Macomber's receipt of a stock
dividend. They represent mere appreciation of his chose in action, his
player account. His legal position vis-A-vis the player account-what he
would analogize to his stock ownership-has not changed at all and,
hence, there is no event, no market transaction, to peg the gain. This is
an initially attractive argument, particularly if the EULA provisions and
the game software together make it difficult, if not impossible, for Leeroy
to extract any value from the virtual items without selling them as part
and parcel of his player account. Focusing on the player account as the
relevant property interest, the prizes look- like mere paper gains to the
value of the account.
The weakness in this second argument is that the Macomber line is a
narrow one indeed.23 Particularly after Cottage Savings Ass'n, the
227. See Hornung, 47 T.C. at 434-35.
228. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 283 (2002) (describing "use" rights as one of the most
essential of property rights).
229. One cannot overstate the robustness of RMT. The best efforts of Blizzard show that
resistance is futile. Players even work around the coding restrictions for "soulbound" items. Even if
Leeroy cannot transfer the Slicer because it is soulbound, he knows where to find it (that is, where
beastie drops it). In such situations, players will sell their services to kill a beast and let the buyer pick
up the dropped item. For these same reasons, I do not give much weight to an argument that the value
of Leeroy's rights in the Slicer and Helm are so contingent on future conditions and circumstances that
such value cannot reasonably be ascertained. There is just too much RMT. For further explanation of
this idea and other ideas Leeroy might use, see Joseph M. Dodge, The Story of Glenshaw Glass:
Towards a Modem Concept of Gross Income, in TAX STORIES 15, 44-51 (Paul L. Caron, ed., 2003).
230. See Kornhauser, supra note 114, at I85-86 (reviewing post-Macomber realization cases
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realization test is simply a search for a change in legal relations,
regardless of economic substance. Any change in relations that puts both
the taxpayer and the IRS "in a position to determine the change in the
value" of the property in question will meet the realization
requirement. 3' And here, as soon as the WoW program credits Leeroy's
account with the Sword and the Helm, that changes Leeroy's legal
relationships; unlike Mrs. Macomber, he now has legal rights (per the
EULA) in these two items different than he had before and different
from any other player. Also unlike Mrs. Macomber, the transaction did
not simply split up the same pie into smaller pieces among the
shareholders. Instead, Leeroy now has a different set of use rights than
other players. His avatar is bigger, badder, better. Most importantly, this
change is an easily discernable and tracked event that allows the IRS to
determine the change in the value of his account. Again, because there is
a readily ascertainable fair market value to the Sword and the Helm, the
administrative concerns over delaying the accounting of this accession to
wealth until another, better time are minimized.
Professor Lederman makes a nice analogy between in-game items
and deck chairs on a cruise ship. So long as each player has similar use
rights in the items traded, there is no realization event.23 Similarly, she
argues that two employees who swap different office equipment owned
by their employer (a bookcase for a printer) do not "realize" any gain
because all they have traded are use rights.233 That is all true, and is the
intuitive case for realization. Even there, however, I believe the analogy
does not quite track. Loot drops in WoW are not swaps, but prizes. They
are more like the cruise ship giving a gift card good in the ship bookstore
for the best limbo dancer. Further, the function of in-world currency as a
medium of exchange might well make it qualitatively different than any
other type of virtual item, so trades of items for currency might still
trigger the Cottage Savings Ass'n trip-wire.
Ultimately, however, the Achilles heel to both of Leeroy's
realization arguments is the status of the EULA. To the extent that the
involving corporate reorganizations).
231. Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 567 (1991).
232. Leandra Lederman, supra note 194 (manuscript at 40, on file with author) ("The reallocation
of deck chairs by the vacationers is not a disposition of an interest in one deck chair and the
acquisition of an interest in another. Rather, each vacationer has a right to use the chairs in the public
areas of the cruise ship. Redistributing possession among those with the usage rights is not a
disposition of property, even if some vacationers who sleep late pay cash to others vacationers who
rose early and claimed all the chairs of the most popular type. The cash received by the early birds is
gross income, but the receipt of cash by them does not make the exchange of the use of one chair for
the use of another chair into a realization event."(citation omitted)).
233. Id. ("The employee has not really disposed of any asset, much less received title to a different
asset. Instead, what has occurred is a relocation of certain items owned by the employer within the
domain controlled by the employer.").
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law gives Leeroy more and more property rights directly in each virtual
item, separate and apart from the EULA provisions (or overriding the
EULA provisions), then his receipt of the virtual Gladiator's Slicer looks
more and more like the receipt of any other distinct item of real-world
property. His claim of unrealized gain becomes less and less credible.
This Achilles heel becomes more evident when one looks at
transactions that take place within Second Life. Zelda does not have to
wait for courts to declare that federal copyright law preempts the TOS
she agreed to. The SL TOS reserves all intellectual property rights to her.
Accordingly, assuming her wedding gown design meets the standards for
copyright protection, she has the right both to sell her wedding gown
design and to sell the right to copy it.
Zelda might nonetheless argue that her exchange of a virtual
wedding gown for L$I,500 is not a realization event because, like every
other player in every other virtual world, her putative accession to wealth
is so contingent on factors out of her control that there is no certainty at
all of her "locking in" her gain in wealth until she cashes out. All game
developers are Gods. And like every other EULA, her agreement with
SL gives the game owners the ultimate right to block her account, to
unwind her transactions, to deprive her of all her L$, or to make any one
of hundreds of design decisions that may adversely affect her, from
changing the landforms around her, to changing the "zoning" codes
(such as by designating her "land" as player-to-player combat zone), to
flooding the market with L$ and so unleashing rampant inflation. 34
Zelda's realization argument proves too much. After all, much the
same can be said about First Life: our world is so contingent on factors
out of our control that any seeming increase in individual wealth could
be wiped out in an instant either by micro events (a falling piano) or
macro events (a nuclear holocaust). This is not the kind of "substantial
restriction" that prevents realization. Accordingly, as far as the
realization requirement is concerned, Zelda's transactions look very
much like the complex barter transaction between Lilly and Kunal with
the L$ serving the same function as trade credits which, in turn, serve the
same function as currency: a repository for the value of the goods and
services that can be purchased. 35
In sum, while the realization argument is intuitively attractive in
some respects, it does not hold up well, I think, to further scrutiny. I
prefer to focus instead on the concept of imputed income. Not only do I
234. These possibilities are inherent in any virtual world. See Bartle, supra note 170, at 27-30
(discussing "evolution" within world and unexpected consequences of design changes). Even
seemingly minor and benign changes can have unhappy results. It's the butterfly effect.
235. See generally Keller, supra note s 19 (discussing the tax treatment of bartering through trade
exchanges).
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believe that analysis leads to the right result currently (no taxation) but it
also gives a reasonable test for when the result should change from "no
taxation" to "taxation." The change should not be dependent on the
formal legal category we assign "virtual items." I suggest that the tax
result should instead follow function, the function of virtual currency.
That is, unless and until virtual currency becomes a true medium of
exchange for goods and services provided in the corporeal world, the
concerns about government over-reaching and intrusion implied by the
imputed income doctrines should outweigh the attraction of taxing
trackable transactions of objects that have a readily ascertainable fair
market value. To that idea I now turn.
3. Imputed Income: The Play Is the Thing
I submit that using the concept of imputed income is the best way to
frame the issue of taxing either the loot drop in WoW or the wedding
dress transaction in SL. Neither Leeroy nor Zelda should have to report
gross income from their in-world activities, even though they have
engaged in identifiable transactions which indisputably increase their
economic wealth and even if courts hold that they have rights in the
virtual items independent of the EULAs. This is because their activities
are not normal market transactions but represent self-provided services
or, at most, enjoyment of self-owned property. The service provided is
play and the property is a right to play, a chose-in-action, a thing.
Like any lawyer I am drawn towards terms of art and I so use the
term "play." By it I do not mean fun and games. My title's reference to
Shakespeare is not accidental. Virtual worlds provide a platform for role-
play, a stage on which people can try on roles that are otherwise
unavailable to them. Throughout our life journey we take on and discard
various roles (child, parent, teacher, student, jackass, saint) that are
integral to our existence and our self-conception of our existence. But
the role-play available in virtual world is separated from that existence
by what game theorists call a "magic circle" and what theater critics call
"the fourth wall." '36 Both of these concepts get to the same idea: that at
an agreed place, time, and in an agreed manner, we can act without
consequence to our "other" life; we can separate what happens at the
agreed place and time from the rest of our existence. Las Vegas has
commercialized the idea' as "what happens in Vegas, stays in Vegas."
Similarly, virtual worlds allow massive numbers of people to engage in
role-play that many do not expect to carry over into their off-line
236. See Edward Castronova, The Right to Play, in THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW, GAMES, AND VIRTUAL
WORLDS 68, 71-75 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., 2006) (describing game theory and
consequences of "ambiguous gaming"); Fourth Wall-Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth-wall (describing use and history of the term "fourth wall" in
theater criticism) (last visited Oct. 31, 2007).
[Vo1. 59: 1
November 2007] A THEORY OF TAXING VIRTUAL WORLDS
worlds. 37
Both concepts, the "magic circle" and the "fourth wall" are
themselves fictions, created and maintained by collective acts of will and
not inherent in the human condition."' Shakespeare explored the
boundaries of the fourth wall with his "play within a play" device in
Hamlet (to "catch the conscience of the King"), 39 as have countless later
playwrights, such as Thornton Wilder in "Our Town." 40 So do thousands
of invisible hands push at the boundaries of virtual worlds as part of a
general cultural commodification of human activity. 4 ' In short, some
people want to role-play for non-monetary reasons; others want to make
a buck. So long as the play is sealed off from the audience, Shylock
should not have to pay tax on the shower of shekels, regardless of
whether the actor playing Shylock "owns" the shekel-props or is just
permitted to use them by the owner of the stage.
The intent of the taxpayer is irrelevant to the search for an
administrable legal concept of gross income.24" If I sell a Hank Aaron
trading card I bought for $i for $io, it does not matter whether I treat my
baseball card collection as a game or a business. Either way, I have $9 of
gross income. So if in-world activity becomes taxable, it is taxable to all
who engage in it, regardless of why they do so, whether for fun or profit.
It is the concept of imputed income that draws the proper line. Not
237. See, e.g., Seth Kugal, A House That's Just Unreal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2007, at Di (exploring
phenomena of online "marriages" between avatars played by people married to other people in the
real world).
238. Just look at the red-faced little league parent screaming at the coach who does not play his or
her child, or at the umpire who made the "wrong" call. Then look at the parent who explains to his or
her crying child the true meaning of the clichd "it's only a game." Teaching children the difference
between games and non-games is a part of their cultural education, as parents and schoolteachers well
know. Children who fail to sufficiently internalize the fiction of games grow up to be the screamers.
239. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, Sc. 2.
240. See generally THORNTON WILDER, OUR TOWN: A PLAY IN THREE ACTS (Perennial 2003).
241. For a wonderful essay on this subject, see Mary Poovey, For Everything Else, There's . . ., 68
Soc. RES. 397, 399 (2ooi) (exploring how "within the modern social imaginary epitomized by the
global system of finance capital, there is almost no limit to the logic that informs commodification.
This logic provides the primary terms in which residents of the modern world imagine value, register
sensations, and experience time and space"). For stories on the commodification of virtual worlds, see,
e.g., Jessica Bennett & Malcom Beith, Alternate Universe: Second Life is Emerging as a Powerful New
Medium for Social Interactions of All Sorts, from Romance to Making Money. It May Be the Internet's
Next Big Thing, NEWSWEEK INT'L, July 30, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.comlid/198768I2/
site/newsweek/page/o/.
242. And, again just as with RMT, intent might be very important in determining whether
appropriate deductions from income are allowed, as for example, under § 162 or § 212 or limited by
§ 183. But even here, it is not subjective intent so much as objective manifestations of intent. See, e.g.,
Theisen v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1327, 1329 (1997) (finding that to avoid the § 183 restrictions on
taking losses from an activity in excess of income generated by that same activity, "[tiaxpayers need
not have a reasonable expectation of profit. However, the facts and circumstances must demonstrate
that they entered into the activity, or continued the activity, with the actual and honest objective of
making a profit") (citations omitted).
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only does it properly disregard intent, it also properly disregards the
trompe l'oeil feature of virtual worlds: the confusion between virtual
representations of items and the items they represent. Just as a virtual
spoon is not really a spoon, neither is the market where virtual spoons
are traded really a market for goods and services. It's a play-market, the
virtual items within it are play-things used to enhance the value of the
play, and the virtual currency which is the medium of exchange is play-
money.
A thought experiment will help illustrate. Suppose an organization
buys a large field outside town and sets up a large walled compound it
names World of Medieval Life. Within the compound is recreated a
medieval village. People can come visit on weekends and pay US$4o at
the gate for a weekend pass. Once inside, people are given a sack of
coins, called Dinars (D$). Each sack contains one hundred Dinars.
Additional sacks cost $20. Once inside, folks are encouraged to make
basic costumes from freely provided materials, and to use their Dinars to
purchase accessories, various forms of entertainment (plays, comedy
acts) and to enter contests. They may also wander around and purchase
nothing. Nothing may leave the compound, however, nor may Dinars be
converted back into Dollars upon exit. People who plan to come back
can keep their stuff in a cardboard box. Neither food nor drink are
allowed in the compound. People can instead eat at a nearby
McDonald's (it does not take Dinars).
Assume Leeroy and Zelda visit. They each pay US$4o and receive
D$ioo. After many weekends of visiting, Leeroy and Zelda get to know
other regular visitors and they meet to play games, put on entertainments
for each other, and picnic. Over time, Leeroy gets to be very, very good
at jousting and wins various prizes, both in the form of accessories (a
sword, a helmet) and in the form of D$. Each time he wins he gets to
stand on a podium and in a meaningful ceremony is handed a sack of D$
or whatever is the prize de jour. Over time, Zelda gets good at making
costumes-especially medieval wedding dresses-which she also trades
for D$ as well as swaps for accessories. Although it is against the rules,
each weekend they sell a sack of D$ioo for US$io which they spend at
the McDonald's.
Leeroy and Zelda eventually acquire thousands of D$ over and
above what they have received in exchange for each entrance fee. They
are awarded the titles of Prince Leeroy and Princess Zelda by the other
regulars. They are held in high esteem for their talents and virtues. They
wear crowns. But they still have to pay the entrance fee to access World
of Medieval Life each weekend. And their D$ are no good except inside
the compound. And their box of dress-ups and stuff must be kept inside
the compound. And when they leave each Sunday afternoon, they
change back into their civilian clothes. And on Monday morning Leeroy
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goes back to shining shoes at the airport and Zelda puts on her security
guard uniform.
Neither Leeroy nor Zelda have any gross income from the
acquisition of Dinars or accessories. The items received from their barter
activity are simply props, good only for their play within World of
Medieval Life. The Dinars they receive from sales and as prizes are,
literally, play money, representing only their flow of satisfactions arising
out of their personal exertions. Thanks to Leeroy's jousting skills,
Zelda's design skills, and both of their trading skills, they get a lot of play
for their entrance fee. It's a bargain purchase. All the Dinars can "buy" is
more play within the walls of World of Medieval Life-more joust
entries, more accessories, more fun. Dinars represent stored "units of
play."
But what about fair market value? Even if Dinars are not true
currency, they are tangible personalty that are readily traded for dollars.
You can touch and hold and hoard Dinars and sell a sack of them for
US$io. What keeps them from being income when received as a prize?
The wall. Conversion to US$ requires breach of the fourth wall. Until
then, they represent in-kind benefits-play; it is economic wealth to be
sure, but self-created. They are acquired through play-market
transactions, not through true market transactions, at least so long as the
"market" activities remain behind the fourth wall and within the magic
circle.
The same operational problems that stay the hand of the
government from taxing other imputed income (valuation and intrusion)
should operate to keep tax administrators from entering World of
Medieval Life. For if Dinars count, then everything that Dinars represent
counts too and the government soon finds itself in the middle of trying to
figure out the value of a wooden play sword.243 The intrusion required to
police all taxpayers so that the honest ones are not suckers is staggering.
It is a low yield, high cost game for the government, just like taxation of
most other types of imputed income. There is time enough to tax Leeroy
and Zelda when they cash out, when the magic circle is broken, the
fourth wall breached. When they exchange Dinars for dollars, they have
243. This is perhaps the central intuition against taxation. See Andrew D. Schwarz & Robert
Bullis, Rivalrous Consumption and the Boundaries of Copyright Law: Intellectual Property Lessons
From Online Games, 10 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 13, 24 n.63 (2005) ("Where there is property, of course,
there is usually taxation. The thought of teenage kids acquiring valuable digital swords and then facing
the prospect of that acquisition being taxed as income is an undesirable outcome to many (including
the authors). It would clearly be cumbersome and troubling if every 'dead spiderling' required an IRS
Tax Form io99."). As with many others, the economist Schwartz and the IP lawyer Bullis suggest that
a cash-out rule is the appropriate one. They conclude, "[h]owever, not all property is taxed upon
acquisition. One tax framework that may work well to alleviate such concerns is that of a
manufactured good and/or a capital asset where taxation occurs only at the point of conversion of in-
game goods to real-world assets." Id.
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traded units of play for units of currency, and only then should the law
impose upon them the duty to faithfully report and pay tax on those
financial transactions as on any other.
Tax law has dealt with "units of play" before. Think casino chips.
They have measurable fair market value and while courts recognize them
as a "medium of exchange," they are not viewed as cash equivalents in
tax law.2" Instead, they are "merely representative of whatever had been
given to acquire them" and that will be either cash or play (a successful
bet). 45 To the extent that a player wins chips over and above purchased
chips, they represent the stored value of the taxpayer's play, a self-
provided service. Even though the self-provide service involved
interaction with other players, that does not make it a true market
transaction. This is an intuitive result to gamblers, who generally want to
get as much "play" as possible for their buy-in. Neither the IRS nor any
court has yet suggested that a taxpayer who spends US$20 to buy twenty
$i casino chips (C$) and fifteen hours later cashes in C$Io for US$io has
gross income within the meaning of § 61, even though the taxpayer might
have, interstitially, held more than C$i,ooo at some point during that
fifteen-hour stretch.246 That taxpayer simply got fifteen hours of "play"
for US$io. The self-provided service is the length of play. A less skilled
(or lucky) taxpayer might lose the entire US$20 stake in fifteen
minutes."' A more skilled player might cash out when up by C$i,ooo and
so report US$98o income.
Unlike realization arguments, the imputed income approach does
not depend on whether the EULA controls the terms of the relationship
among players and game owners, or whether the EULA provisions are
trumped by common law or statutory rules. If the EULAs control, then
their income is imputed service income; if players have property rights in
244 Zarin v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. io84, iioo (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 916 F.2d IIO (3d Cir.
1990).
245. Theodore P. Seto, Inside Zarin, 59 S.M.U. L. REV. 1761, 1783 (2006). The use of chips to
purchase food, drink, and some services, both inside the casino and outside the casino is a good
example of the breach of the magic circle. In Las Vegas, one can take chips from one casino on the
strip to another and use them interchangeably. See I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory (Dec. 28, 1995), 1995
WL 1918359 (discussing outstanding chip and token liability). Although chips thus approach cash
equivalency, what they can buy is still so significantly limited, they fall short. Instead of representing
the stored value of all the goods and services in a national economy, they just represent the stored
value of play. They are, in other words, units of play.
246. But see I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 05-32-025 (May 3, 2005) (holding that casual game site operator
must report as "payments" online credits made to taxpayer's gaming account, where credits performed
same function as casino chips and taxpayer had not yet cashed out). I will discuss the significant
implications of this ruling for online casual gaming and online gambling in a future article.
247. Nor does this treatment of casino chips result from application of the realization exception,
because the chips have a fixed exchange rate and also, at least in Nevada, the casino is under a legal
duty to pay the chips. See I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory (Dec. 28, 1995), supra note 245. So receipt of a
casino chip as compensation for services would be income as much as receipt of a "discount" in price is
income when given as compensation.
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virtual items, then their income derives from self-owned property. Just as
ownership of the stage props does not make the staged activity any more
''real," so is the ownership of "virtual items" something of a red herring
for taxation. This can be seen better by applying the imputed income
analysis to Leeroy and Zelda's activities in WoW and SL.
The loot drop represents economic income to Leeroy. Section 6i
should not reach it, however, because it represents the value of self-
provided services. Like a self-prepared tax return has economic value but
results from the taxpayer's own skill-set, so the loot drop results from
Leeroy's WoW-playing skills. Among those are planning ahead, wise use
of resources, physical agility, coordination to control his avatar's moves,
and interacting with other players in the virtual world environment (his
Guild) to mount a successful quest. All of those skills are self-directed:
they give Leeroy more WoW play for his monthly access fee. Even the
interaction with other players in the play-market is more properly
analogous to the non-taxable activity of carpools or babysitting
cooperatives than to barter clubs. All of this is true regardless of whether
Leeroy's owns "virtual items."
If Leeroy has no rights to his prizes except as provided through the
WoW EULA, then his play is like any do-it-yourself homeowner project;
it simply enhances the value of his player account, which as discussed
above is a chose-in-action. If Leeroy does have rights to these virtual
items independent of the EULA such that the non-tax law will treat
them "property" in and of themselves (as if they were really tangible
personalty), then his play becomes a self-provided service. The function
of each item remains limited to use in the virtual world-to quest, to
fight, to play at being the top dwarf-paladin in all of Aezeroth.
Acquisition of virtual items would therefore be like a hunter who takes
game, a fisher who takes fish, or a farmer who harvests the crop. They all
have imputed income on the realization of each of their items of
inventory and are not taxed until their self-obtained inventory is
disposed of by a later realization event.24
Leeroy's acquisition of G$ through in-game transactions is likewise
imputed income because the G$ represent only the stored value of play,
a medium which enhances Leeroy's flexibility in participating in the great
improvisation taking place on the virtual stage. Although G$ has a
readily ascertainable fair market value, it does not function as currency
because it is not the stored value of all the goods and services in the
248. Morris v. Comm'r, 9 B.T.A. 1273, 1278 (1928). This result is also implied by Treas. Reg.
§ i.61-4(a)(i) (as amended in 1997) . See generally Joseph M. Dodge, Accessions to Wealth, Realization
of Gross Income, and Dominion and Control Applying the 'Claim of Right Doctrine' to Found Objects,
Including Record-Setting Baseballs, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 685, 696-97 (2O00). Professor Leandra Lederman
disagrees with my analysis, arguing that "taken" property is not imputed income. See supra note 194.
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marketplace. 49 It is rather the stored value of an identical set of goods or
services in a closed system. It is like a swap of babysitting services, only
here it is play services. If he is able to sell either a virtual item for US$, or
his player account for US$, that is the time when he converts his
economic gain in wealth into "gross income" within the meaning of § 6i.
Cash-out rules.
Zelda's "sale" of a wedding dress for L$ should likewise be treated
as imputed income, for the same reasons. Zelda is not a wedding dress
designer; she simply plays one in Second Life. Her skill in that role
results in her ability to play more on the virtual stage of Second Life. She
might also play other roles, by playing more than one avatar.5 ' If she
swaps the dress for, say, a thunderstorm, what she receives for the
representation of a wedding dress is the representation of something
else, a prop. It is a limited unit of play. It is true that Linden Dollars
represent a more flexible unit of play than a wedding dress, but so long
as the fourth wall holds, they still represent only the stored value of her
self-provided service or the benefit of using her self-owned property.
There is time enough to tax her when she exchanges her L$ for US$ and
transforms the self-created value into usable wealth. This is true
regardless of Zelda's intent. Even if she provides in-world programming
services for L$ because she wants to profit from her activities, she still
has to cash them out to make them usable wealth. Her intent alone does
not transform them into something other than units of play, at least not
until they become spendable outside the virtual stage of Second Life.
4. When Imputed Income Becomes Gross
In the final analysis, the idea of imputed income is a better guide to
an administrable legal definition of "gross income" than is the idea of
realization. At some point, in-world activity might well become so
connected with real world activity that what is earned or created or
traded in-world ought to become "gross income" within the meaning of
§ 61. I suggest that that point will occur when in-world currency ceases to
be mere "units of play" and becomes instead fully functional currency.
While it is admittedly a line-drawing problem, I think it is the right line
to be looking at, as I hope to illustrate by taking a closer look at Second
Life.
Second Life residents make a big deal out of how the TOS gives
them "ownership" of virtually represented items. These folks need to
249. This is certainly true for in-world currency vis-A-vis established economies in Europe and
North America. Query, however, whether this is as true for less stable currencies. See Kent Ewing,
China's Virtual Currency Threatens the Yuan, AsIA TIMES ONLINE, Dec. 5, 2005,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China-Business/HLo5Cboi .html.
250. See Castronova, Virtual Worlds, supra note 13, at 24 (finding that players in Everquest played
an average of 2.72 avatars).
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take a long, deep breath of First Life air. The only "property" they have
is the chose-in-action, the right to play, granted through the TOS. The
TOS does not grant them anything else. Sure, it allows the residents to
keep any intellectual property rights for anything they create while in
Second Life. But it is federal law which grants the rights, not the TOS.
The SL TOS simply refrains from making players waive those rights in
order to play, in contrast to the WoW TOS which does demand waiver.
Federal copyright law protects "original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. 25. But copyright
protection does not extend to "any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work.2 52 This statutory language is called the idea/expression dichotomy.
Only the expression of the ideas is protected, not the ideas themselves.
"[C]opyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but
encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information
conveyed by a work." '253 In general, the more abstract and original the
expressive component of the work, the broader the protection, but the
more the work is just an expression of commonly accessible factual
information, the "thinner" is the copyright protection. There are just too
few ways to express a telephone directory, for example, to give much
copyright protection for them. '54
The holder of a federal copyright gets a bundle of rights. 55 Among
them are the right to make copies, distribute copies, make derivative
works, and display or perform the work publicly, including digital
transmission in the case of "literary" works.56 Of potential importance to
SL residents is that "computer software" is subject to copyright
protection, being considered a subset of "literary works." '257 The term
"computer software" is defined broadly as any "set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to
bring about a certain result." '' s And software is considered "fixed in any
tangible medium of expression" when it is stored on a computer hard
251. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
252. Id.
253. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (I991); see also Meridian
Project Sys. v. Hardin Constr. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d Iioi, 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (discussing dichotomy
in context of deciding whether end user's copying of software help files infringed copyright).
254. Feist Publ'ns, Inc.. 499 U.S. at 362.
255. Herwig v. United States, lo5 F. Supp. 384,389 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
256. 17 U.S.C. § io6 (2000).
257. 17 U.S.C. § 1OS (2000); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 54 (1976) (subject matter of copyright
includes "literary works" which includes software programs).
258. 17 U.S.C. § Ios.
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drive or a server or in any other machine-readable form.259
What this means for Zelda and her wedding dress is that she
probably has the intellectual property right to copy her wedding dress.
Recall that SL players create virtual objects by using a high-level script to
manipulate lego-like building blocks called "primitives." For example, a
player could write a short program to create a butterfly that followed his
or her avatar around. Although the tools of creation are provided by the
game developers and owners, they are immensely powerful. The creation
of in-game items is limited largely by player imagination. In-game items
are, therefore, quite plausibly works of authorship and expression in
which the players can hold a copyright.
Zelda has not only "painted" her dress, and so has the copyright in
the representation, she has also likely "scripted" her dress and so has
copyright in the script. So she could copy either the dress out on paper,
and sell it to a real life dress designer, or she could copy the script and
sell that, to other SL residents, for example. It is the latter transaction
that I have been using through this Article: when Zelda sells a virtual
dress, she is really selling a copy of the script that creates the virtual
representation. Sellers like Zelda will generally make the dress
customizable. For example, she might well have scripted her dress to
change color depending on the color of shoes on the buyer's avatar.
Further, no real life or Second Life dress designer can troll Second Life
and copy her dress without Zelda's permission (which can presumably be
purchased).
As a practical matter, the copyright protection for Zelda's coding is
pretty weak. Once Zelda takes her script out of the Second Life
environment, it has no value. It won't produce a dress. The only reason
her script produces a dress in Second Life is because the game
developers have written or bought a substantial amount of other code
that takes her script and, step by step, translates it into machine readable
form and then allows that information to interact with the design and
operation of the programming language that creates the SL virtual world.
The fantasy wedding dress produced by the script exists in the ballroom
of SL. Outside that environment, the script is a pumpkin.
Linden Dollars (L$) operate the same way as Zelda's dress. They
are programmed to look like a medium of exchange but they only
function as such within the SL environment. The SL TOS, section 1.4
provides that "Linden Dollars represent a limited license right to use a
feature of the simulated environment.'' That is just another way of
259. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247 (3d Cir. 1983).
260. This is Linden Labs' consistent position. See Wong, supra note I7. Zelda and all the other
"residents" of SL have perhaps less rights in L$ than gamblers have in casino chips. They certainly do
not have copy rights, either in the representation of currency (as a number in a certain place on the
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saying that Linden Dollars represent units of play.
As long as that is true, and as long as the L$ is good only on the SL
stage, then the fourth wall remains strong. In-world transactions should
not be taxed because they produce, at most, imputed income. However,
L$ might morph into real currency. Linden Lab might act differently
than its TOS suggests. The Linden Dollar's value in the game requires it
to hold a relatively stable value. Too much inflation or deflation will
make the game not worth the server time (an update on the old English
saying that the game is not worth the candle). An unintended
consequence of the game design might be the creation of a new
currency-heck, Linden Dollars already have a better exchange rate with
the US$ than most nations.
The breakdown of the magic circle, the feared commodification of
virtual worlds, can only come about when, like Pinocchio, the virtual
becomes real, when economic activity in Second Life begins to displace
economic activity outside Second Life.262 The most likely evidence of that
shift will be when account owners gain the ability to trade Linden Dollars
for goods and services that are useful outside of Second Life, beyond the
fourth wall. Then you will not be able to tell the players from the
audience. For example, H&R Block and other companies have
established offices in Second Life. Different clothing and car
manufacturers have created a presence in Second Life. When those or
other businesses start accepting Linden Dollars in payment for tax
services or for cars that you can drive on the street of your town, that
signals the breach of the fourth wall. When online exchanges outside of
Second Life-such as Amazon.com or Staples.com-start accepting
payment in Linden Dollars, that will mark the erasing of the magic circle.
At that time Second Life will become a barter club and Linden Dollars
will cease to be a unit of play and will become like Trade Credits,
representing not just the stored value of role-playing but the stored value
of all the real corporeal world market has to offer.
Just as with the history of barter club taxation, the operational
objections to taxing in-world transactions will cease when the activity
rises to a point that the tax administrators can implement a system
whereby the income realized can be reliably measured, reported and
paid. Whether or when that time will come I have no idea. But that will
be when the economic and legal concepts of income will synchronize.
account part of the player's screen) or in the coding that produces the Linden Dollar.
261. For an interesting speculation on how Second Life currency would be treated under the
foreign currency rules in the Tax Code, see Steven Chung, Real Taxation of Virtual Commerce: Has
Second Life Crossed the Line? 13-19 (Spring 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Hastings
Law Journal).
262. I am indebted to a conversation with Steven Chung for this idea.
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CONCLUSION
On the one hand, this Article is timely. Online worlds involve lots of
real money and are absorbing lots of real labor. Where money flows,
taxation follows. Currently, although plenty of money is flowing into
companies like Blizzard, Inc. (owners of World of Warcraft) and Linden
Lab (owners of Second Life), there is no money flowing within either
virtual world. There are prizes and there are exchanges, but those are all
props in a play. No money flows, only virtual representations of money,
units of play. If and when players cash out by selling virtual items or
player accounts for United States dollars in Real Money Transactions
(RMT), that is when the tax collector will be there (virtually speaking),
with palm extended. How taxpayers should report their RMT is beyond
the scope of this Article. It will depend, in part, on whether they are
selling goods or services or whether they are making a sale of a copy or a
sale of a copyright. That is all grist for another's mill.
On the other hand, this Article is premature. There is no indication
that the IRS is remotely interested in the topic. The subject seems purely
academic-and, as I hope you will agree, it is a great academic subject,
allowing a fresh look at some very basic tax principles. Yet I can suggest
that there are three ways in which the subject might be brought to the
attention of the good, hardworking, folks at the IRS. Two are fairly
remote. One is not.
First, the issue might arise at the policy level, either at the IRS or
Congress. The staff of the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) is in the
process of preparing a White Paper on the subject. Although the JEC is
not a Committee with jurisdiction over tax statutes, it has an important
voice in the process. I think it a very remote possibility that anyone at the
policy level will take steps to try and tax in-world transactions. But that is
not the real problem for players (or residents) in virtual worlds. Congress
enacted § 6i long, long ago and the problem is whether this existing law
extends to in-world activity.
Second, the issue could come up in audit. If our gamers Leeroy or
Zelda were audited, a sharp-eyed Revenue Agent (or one who also
played games) might ask to review their online, in-world activity and
might conclude that § 61 did indeed reach the loot drop in WoW or the
wedding dress sale in SL. Again, however, this is a remote possibility.
Not only are audit rates very small, but the IRS almost always pre-
identifies issues for the Revenue Agents to look at. Unless there is some
third party reporting it, an issue of unreported income will likely be
missed.
It is the third-party reporting issue that presents the third and most
likely possibility. Section 6041 requires "all persons engaged in a trade or
business and making payment in the course of such trade or business to
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another person ... of $600 or more" to report that payment to the IRS
on an information return, usually a Form IO99. Section 6045 imposes the
same requirement on any broker, defined as "any ... person who (for a
consideration) regularly acts as a middleman with respect to property or
services." For years, auction site owners like eBay have argued that they
are not "brokers" within the meaning of § 6045 and, accordingly, do not
have to file information returns.263 However, the President's Fiscal Year
2008 budget proposal would expand the scope of § 6045 definition of
"broker" to include auction site owners like eBay, and that would likely
include virtual item auction sites such as IGE. 64
Game developers, particularly Linden Lab, Blizzard, Sony, or other
corporations who own and run virtual worlds might well want to know
their third-party reporting duties. If players' trades online constitute
taxable transactions and if the loot that game developers award
constitute taxable prizes, then the game developers already have a duty
under § 6045 to report to the IRS on Form IO99 any payments of more
than $6oo to a single player. If the President's Fiscal Year 2oo8 budget
proposal is enacted into law, then cautious "grey-market" auction site
owners might also want a ruling about the tax consequences of virtual
property. This is how I would think the issue is most likely to arise in the
real world.
Virtual Worlds are exciting places, filled with wonders that saturate
the senses. They are commonly viewed as something new. They are not.
We have seen virtual worlds before: we call them stages. Nonetheless,
since online virtual worlds allow millions of people to role-play in ways
that mimic the corporeal world, they do provide opportunity to review
some of the basic doctrines of substantive tax law, and to re-explore the
connections of those legal doctrines to practicalities of modern tax
administration. While they may not be something new under the sun,
they may still help us better understand something old: how tax shadows
life.
263. See E-mail from Margaret M. Richardson to Eric Soloman and Michael Desmond (Apr. 6,
2007, 2:45 p.m.), in TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 25, 2007, available at LEXIS, 2007 TNT 8o-24.
264. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR
2008 REVENUE PROPOSALS 65 (2007), available at http://www.treas.gov/officesltax-policy/
librarylbluebko7.pdf.
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